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This dissertation investigates two aspects of how to regulate the financial sector optimally
in order to increase macroeconomic stability and mitigate the risk of future financial crises.
Chapter 1 analyzes the desirability of international coordination in financial regulation.
It develops a two-country model of systemic liquidity risk-taking in which financial market
imperfections provide a rationale for macro-prudential regulation. In the model, curbing
liquidity risk-taking via regulation lowers the price of liquidity during financial crises and
thereby reduces the costs associated with market incompleteness. But regulation also entails
costs in the form of distortions to productive investment decisions. The discrepancy between
the domestic dimension of the costs and the global dimension of the benefits of regulation
generates free-riding incentives among regulators operating in different countries. The theory
predicts that absent international coordination, national authorities are tempted to regulate
their financial systems in a way that results in excessive illiquidity. It therefore speaks in
favor of a stronger global coordination of banking regulation.
Chapter 2 analyzes the social optimality of private debt maturity choices. It studies debt
maturity decisions in a dynamic macroeconomic model in which financial frictions give rise
to systemic risk in the form of amplification effects. Long-term liabilities provide insurance
against shocks to the asset side of the balance sheet, but they come at an extra cost. The
debt maturity structure therefore maps into an allocation of macroeconomic risk between
lenders and leveraged borrowers, and fundamental shocks propagate more powerfully in the
economy when the maturity is shorter. The market equilibrium is not constrained efficient
as borrowers fail to internalize their contribution to systemic risk and take on too much
short-term debt in a decentralized economy. The theory indicates that a tax on short-term
debt – a form of macroprudential policy – leads to Pareto improvements and results in less
volatile allocations and asset prices.
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1. MACRO-PRUDENTIAL POLICY COORDINATION AND
GLOBAL REGULATORY SPILLOVERS
1.1 Introduction
The financial globalization process that started in the early 1980s was accompanied early
on by attempts to harmonize banking regulation internationally. The original motivation for
the first Basel accords (Basel I) was twofold: to ensure the stability of the global financial
system and to eliminate distortions to competition arising from heterogenous regulatory
regimes. Over time, national competitiveness concerns turned more dominant (Tarullo 2008),
and they became the focus of the academic literature analyzing the international linkages
relevant for banking regulation (see e.g. Acharya 2003, Dell Arricia and Marquez 2006). This
focus on competitiveness issues raises the question of whether the goal of financial stability
in and of itself requires an international coordination of banking regulation. This paper
investigates this question in a model where agents’ contribution to systemic risk calls for a
macro-prudential approach to regulation.
We refer to liquidity as the aggregate amount of resources set aside to satisfy potential
needs for funds. Liquidity has public goods properties during periods of market stress (Shin
2010). By limiting agents’ exposure to liquidity risk, regulators can reduce the scarcity of
liquidity during crises and alleviate credit crunches. But national regulators fail to adequately
internalize the share of positive externalities associated with global liquidity that operates
across borders. Consequently, individual countries try to free-ride on the foreign provision
of liquidity. A lack of international coordination therefore results in insufficient macro-
prudential regulation. This underprovision of ex-ante regulation leads to more severe and
more costly financial crises ex-post.
The analysis is undertaken in the context of a two-country version of a model of liquidity
demand, in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001).1 Ex-ante identical agents invest in risky long-term projects that may require an ad-
ditional liquidity injection along the road. Liquidity shocks are imperfectly correlated across
countries, implying opportunities for international risk-sharing. Because of moral hazard,
cross-country insurance against these shocks is limited, but agents can set aside liquid re-
sources ex-ante by investing in a short-term asset (i.e. self-insure), or alternatively, they
can borrow ex-post on an international spot market up to some limit. In this environment,
market incompleteness results in a constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium.
Agents fail to internalize that their collective investment choice affects the severity of a po-
tential credit crunch, and they underinvest in short-term assets in equilibrium. Curbing
agents’ exposure to liquidity risk via prudential regulation can restore constrained efficiency.
We compare three alternative allocation mechanisms: (a) the laissez-faire outcome (com-
petitive equilibrium), (b) the constrained efficient outcome achieved by setting regulation
cooperatively at a global level, and (c) the equilibrium of a policy game where regulation is
chosen non-cooperatively by welfare maximizing national authorities.
1 See also the related consumer liquidity demand models of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin (1987),
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), Hellwig (1994), von Thadden (1999) and others.
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The inefficiency of decentralized investment decisions in the model results from a pecu-
niary externality operating via the price of global liquidity, i.e. the international interest
rate, in a crisis. This interest rate depends on the scarcity of liquidity. A marginal increase
in the liquidity of the representative agent’s ex-ante investment portfolio from its competitive
equilibrium level lowers the interest rate and causes a redistribution of wealth from lenders to
borrowers in a crisis. Due to the incompleteness of markets, borrowers value liquidity more
highly than lenders ex-post. Since ex-ante, any agent could end up with a high or with a low
valuation of liquidity, a marginally lower interest rate achieves a redistribution of resources
from low valuation states of nature to high valuation states. Such a redistribution partially
substitutes for missing risk markets and leads to a first order welfare gain. A global planner
maximizing a representative agent’s welfare would require agents to tilt their investment in
favor of short-term assets, with the consequence of alleviating credit crunches when a crisis
occurs. But while such regulation brings about an improvement in exchange efficiency, it
distorts productive investment decisions away from their competitive level. In choosing the
optimal extent of regulation, a global planner thus trades off an improvement in exchange
efficiency with a deterioration in production efficiency in the world economy.
National planners, who set regulation non-cooperatively to maximize the welfare of a do-
mestic representative agent, do perceive the dependence of the severity of a potential credit
crunch upon ex-ante investment choices. But in contrast to a global planner, they attempt
to shift surplus in favor of residents rather than restore constrained efficiency. In partic-
ular, national planners recognize that more domestic ex-ante liquidity hoarding (i.e. more
domestic investment in short-term assets resulting from tighter regulation) would alleviate
a foreign credit crunch by lowering the interest rate, which redistributes resources in favor
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of foreign residents in states of nature where foreigners with a high valuation of liquidity
borrow from domestic lenders with a low valuation of liquidity. But national planners derive
no benefits from alleviating credit crunches abroad. Since the pecuniary externality oper-
ates across borders, national planners do not internalize the full exchange efficiency benefits
of regulation. At the same time, the production efficiency costs of regulation are incurred
domestically. Consequently, national planners generally fall short of imposing the optimal
extent of regulation. This underprovision of ex-ante regulation results in more severe and
more costly financial crises ex-post, in the form of larger interest rate spikes and more forced
liquidation of real investments. In fact, national planners’ incentives to manipulate state-
contingent terms of trade (i.e. interest rates) in favor of residents can cause the equilibrium of
the non-cooperative regulation game to feature even less liquid and more risky investments
than the laissez-faire benchmark. When this occurs, welfare is lower with uncoordinated
regulation than under laissez-faire. In other words, uncoordinated regulation can be worse
than no regulation at all.
The underprovision of regulation can be interpreted as a beggar-thy-neighbor outcome.
Global liquidity mainly benefits distressed countries during crises, so it is attractive for a
country to take advantage of foreign liquidity provision when one is distressed, but not to
provide liquidity to distressed foreigners when one is intact. Viewed through the lens of
the literature on international policy coordination (see e.g. Cooper 1985 and Persson and
Tabellini 1995), the result can also be interpreted as arising from the attempt by national
planners to make use of monopoly and monopsony power in the market for international
liquidity during crises. Alternatively, the underprovision of regulation can be seen as resulting
from a variation of the hold up problem (Grout 1984 and Tirole 1986). In the model, the
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returns from “investing” in a sound domestic financial system (via prudential regulation)
within the trading relationship between the two countries exceed the returns outside the
trading relationship. And once the investment is sunk (the regulation enacted), the investor
(regulator) has to share the gross return with its trading partner (the other country). As
in the classical hold up problem, this anticipated expropriation leads to underinvestment
ex-ante.
The constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria in incomplete markets economies
is well known since the work of Hart (1975), Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemar-
chakis (1986). So too is the suboptimality of uncoordinated macroeconomic policies since at
least Johnson (1965) and Hamada (1976). The novelty of the present paper is to analyze in
a common framework the interplay between distortions arising from market incompleteness
and those resulting from openness and countries’ monopoly and monopsony power in global
markets. The analysis outlines the close link between the mechanics of policy incentives
arising from these two kinds of distortions. A constrained global planner internalizes pecu-
niary externalities in much the same way as strategically acting governments do. But the
former does so to improve exchange efficiency and reduce the cross-sectional wedges between
marginal rates of substitutions caused by incomplete markets. In contrast, the latter use
market power to shift surplus in their favor, generally at the cost of widening these wedges
and reducing overall efficiency.
The model offers predictions about the international spillover effects of changes in reg-
ulation. Starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium, the introduction of a small regulation
in one country increases risk-taking in the other country. The transmission channels work
through the lowering of interest rates during crises brought about by the extra amount of
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liquidity set aside in the regulated country. The model also predicts that macro-prudential
policies are strategic substitutes across countries, as a country’s tightening of regulation, by
increasing the amount of global liquidity, reduces the benefits of regulation for the other
country. Finally the model delivers the result that, starting from the laissez-faire equilib-
rium, a unilateral adoption of liquidity regulation can be welfare reducing for the regulated
country and welfare improving for the unregulated country.
The analysis is done in the context of a model where agents can borrow internationally
when hit by liquidity shocks. We show that all results fully carry over to a setup where agents
raise liquidity during crises by selling long-term assets rather than by borrowing. In that
setup, the pecuniary externality works through an asset price and takes the form of cash-
in-the-market pricing and fire-sale externalities (Allen and Gale 1998). The coordination
problem between regulators can hence be alternatively interpreted as arising from a failure
to commit mutually to supporting asset prices during crises.
At an abstract level, the regulation game analyzed in this paper corresponds to a liquidity
demand model with two large agents. It is often argued that market power mitigates the
harm caused by systemic externalities, because large agents partly internalize the effect of
their actions on prices. We show here that this need not be the case. Whether market power
attenuates or amplifies the distortions caused by market incompleteness crucially depends
on the direction of the pecuniary externalities imposed on ex-post identical agents. Market
power tends to attenuate market incompleteness distortions when these externalities are
negative (like fire-sale externalities), but it tends to amplify distortions when the externalities
are positive (like cash-in-the-market pricing externalities). In situations similar to our model,
where agents impose both negative and positive externalities on ex-post identical agents, the
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effect of market power on market incompleteness distortions can potentially go either way.
Literature
The paper fits into a recent research agenda that motivates financial regulation from a
second best perspective in incomplete markets environments. It is most closely related to the
liquidity regulation approach of Allen and Gale (2004) and Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski
(2009), and to the sudden stop prevention analysis of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001,
2004) for emerging countries. As in these papers, the market failure calling for government
intervention in the present paper originates from a pecuniary externality operating on a
spot market for liquidity.2 But our paper stands out from these by explicitly formulating a
multi-country framework. The model structure is therefore closer to that of Castiglionesi,
Feriozzi, and Lorenzoni (2010), whose main focus is on the positive implications of financial
integration for the liquidity of banks’ portfolios and the magnitude of interest rate spikes in
crises. They briefly touch upon normative issues by solving numerically for the constrained
efficient allocation, but ignore the potential coordination problem that arises in attempting to
implement this allocation when regulation is set at a national level. In contrast, we consider
the incentives faced by rationally acting national regulators, analytically characterize the
equilibrium of the policy game and compare it with both the laissez-faire outcome and the
constrained efficient allocation achieved by coordinating regulation globally.
In modeling the strategic interaction among national governments, this paper follows
the game theoretic approach to macroeconomic policy coordination pioneered by Hamada
2 Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2011b) emphasize a related pecuniary externality working through asset
prices and fire-sale spirals during financial crises. Bianchi (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2011), Bianchi and
Mendoza (2010) and Bengui (2011) investigate the quantitative relevance of these pecuniary externalities in
infinite horizon macroeconomic models.
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(1974, 1976, 1979).3 Governments are assumed to set policies to maximize national welfare,
while taking into account their power to affect international prices. By attempting to use
market power to shift surplus in favor of domestic residents, governments generally end up in
Pareto-inferior equilibria. Our results parallel those of studies where distortions induced by
openness can overturn the direction of a desirable policy intervention, such as Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001). In their model, monopoly distortions in production together with nominal
rigidities make unexpected monetary expansions welfare improving (as in Blanchard and
Kiyotaki 1987 and Ball and Romer 1989) when carried out simultaneously at home and
abroad. But the same policy can be welfare reducing for a country acting in isolation because
of adverse endogenous terms of trade movements. Similarly, in our model, financial market
imperfections make prudential regulation unambiguously welfare improving when introduced
jointly at home and abroad. But terms of trade movements working through the interest
rate during crises and associated spillover effects can make the unilateral introduction of
such a policy welfare reducing for a given country.
Our paper is also related to Acharya (2003), who studies the consequences of an inter-
national convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of heterogenous national
closure policies, and Dell Arricia and Marquez (2006), who analyze the incentives for national
bank regulators to form a regulatory union. In both of those papers, regulatory spillovers
operate through changes in the degree of competition faced by banks on international loan
markets during tranquil times. In our model, this competition channel is absent and inter-
national spillovers only arise through pecuniary externalities operating in a global market
3 Since Hamada’s work, there has been a large literature on macroeconomic policy coordination and
interdependence. See the reviews in Cooper (1985) and Persson and Tabellini (1995).
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for liquidity during financial crises. Out paper therefore stands out in focussing on an inter-
national coordination motive directly linked to the financial stability objective of banking
regulation.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is presented in section 1.2. Global and
national regulations are analyzed in section 1.3. Section 1.4 works out the implications of
the framework for the international spillovers of regulatory policies. Section 1.5 presents an
alternative model in which the ex-post intermediation of funds occurs via an asset market
rather than via a credit market. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 A two-country model of liquidity demand
This section presents the model in which the coordination problem between national
regulators is analyzed. The environment is specified in section 1.2.1, and the competitive
equilibrium is characterized in section 1.2.2.
1.2.1 Preferences, technology and markets
Agents, Time and Preferences The world economy is composed of two countries, indexed
by j ∈ {A,B}, that are ex-ante identical with respect to preferences, endowments and
technology. Each country is populated by a continuum of identical agents. Time lasts
for three periods t = 0, 1, 2, and consumption takes place at date 2. Agents’ preferences
over date 2 consumption are represented by an increasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable utility function u(·).
9
Technology Each agent is born with an endowment of one unit of the consumption good
at date 0, and decides how to allocate this endowment between investment in a risky and
illiquid project k and investment in a safe storage technology ℓ. With probability 1− α, all
projects in country j remain intact. An intact project does not require additional funds at
date 1 and yields a date 2 return of A > 1. With probability α, a project becomes distressed
and necessitates a renewed investment of one good per unit at date 1 for the project to yield
a date 2 return of A. Each unit not shored up at date 1 yields a reduced date 2 return of
r < 1. Distressed agents have the possibility to scale down investment at date 1. For an
initial project of size k, a continuation scale θ results in a date 1 cost of θk and a date 2
return of rk + θ∆k, where ∆ ≡ A − r. The storage technology yields one date t + 1 good
per date t unit invested, and can be accessed both at date 0 and date 1.
Uncertainty All the uncertainty is resolved at date 1. Liquidity shocks are imperfectly cor-
related across the two countries. The sample space is given by Ω = {(i, i), (i, s), (s, i), (s, s)},
where in state (i, s) country A is intact and country B is distressed.The probability mass
function π : Ω → [0, 1] assigns a probability to each state ω ∈ Ω.
Markets The imperfect correlation of liquidity shocks across countries creates opportunities
for international risk-sharing. The assumption maintained throughout the paper, though, is
that only non-state contingent bonds can be traded across borders. This can be motivated
by the lack of verifiability of country-specific shocks.4
Agents can substitute for risk-sharing by borrowing and lending at date 1 on an inter-
4 Because agents are ex-ante identical, non-contingent claims as well as claims contingent on the states
(i, i) and (s, s) would not be traded at date 0 in equilibrium, so these markets can be abstracted from for
the sake of simplicity.
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Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
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Intact
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ℓ+ dω − θωk −Rωdω
Fig. 1.1: Time line.
national spot market at interest rate Rω. Distressed agents borrow dωj , while intact agents
lend −dωj . The size of loans on this market is constrained by distressed agents’ ability to
commit to repay their debt at date 2. We assume lenders can only repossess a fraction κ
of distressed agents’ date 2 output and that any excess production based on reinvestment
at date 1 is neither observable nor verifiable. This implies that borrowing must satisfy the
collateral constraint Rωdωj ≤ κrkj. The time line is represented in Figure 1.1.
Assumptions on parameters
Assumption 1 (Yield of illiquid project). The yield on the illiquid project satisfies 1 < A ≤
3
2
and ∆ ≡ A− r > 1.
The assumption that A > 1 ensures that the illiquid project has a higher yield than the
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liquid asset in normal times, albeit not excessively so. The assumption that ∆ > 1, on the
other hand, captures the idea that distressed firms have a high marginal value of investment
during crisis times. It implies that shoring up an additional unit of a distressed project, if
feasible, is always socially desirable.
Assumption 2 (Probability of crisis). The probability α of a project becoming distressed
satisfies α < α < ᾱ, where α is given by
α =
(A− 1)u′(A)
(A− 1)u′(A) + (∆− r)u′(r)























Assumption 2 captures the fact that financial crises are low probability events, but that
they are likely enough to induce precautionary behavior in the form of some liquidity hoard-
ing. α > α guarantees that crises are likely enough that agents find it optimal to hoard a
positive amount of liquid assets, while α < ᾱ ensures that crisis are rare enough that when a
crisis hits one of the two countries, the global aggregate amount of liquidity hoarded ex-ante
is not sufficient to shore up all illiquid projects in the distressed country. Together, these
two assumptions imply that there is partial liquidation in a crisis.
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1.2.2 Competitive equilibrium
We start by considering equilibrium in the date 1 spot market for given date 0 decisions.
We will then proceed backwards to solve for the competitive equilibrium and regulated
equilibria at date 0.
Date 1 spot market equilibrium
The date 1 value of an intact agent in country j is given by







ω − 1) + ℓj
)
. (1.1)
The intact agent’s date 2 consumption in (1.1) is given by the sum of the return on its
illiquid project Akj, the return on the loan made on the date 1 spot market −R
ωdωj , and
the return on the funds invested at date 1 in the storage technology ℓj + d
ω
j . Without loss
of generality, we assume that intact agents can only lend on the date 1 spot market. Their
lending capacity is limited by their date 1 liquid resources ℓj.
The form of the objective in (1.1) implies a simple loan supply schedule for intact agents.
For Rω < 1, intact agents do not want to lend at all. At Rω = 1, they are indifferent between
lending any amount between 0 and ℓj. Finally, when R
ω > 1 they are willing to lend all
their available liquidity ℓj.
The date 1 value of a distressed agent in country j is given by








j kj − θ
ω






θωj kj ≤ ℓj + d
ω
j (1.3)
Rωdωj ≤ κrkj (1.4)
θωj ≤ 1 (1.5)
A distressed agent’s date 2 consumption in (1.2) is the sum of the return on its illiquid project
rkj + ∆θ
ω
j kj and the return on the funds invested at date 1 in the storage technology ℓj +
dωj − θ
ω
j kj , minus the debt repayment R
ωdωj . (1.3) is the date 1 budget constraint indicating
that reinvestment θωj kj needs to be covered by the sum of ex-ante liquidity hoarding ℓj and
ex-post borrowing dωj . (1.4) is a collateral constraint, and (1.5) indicates that investment
cannot be scaled up at date 1.
Given the assumption that ∆ > 1 and the fact that θωj and d
ω
j enter additively in the
expression of consumption, the loan demand and optimal continuation scale of distressed
agents take simple forms. For Rω < 1, the agents hit their collateral constraint (1.4). For 1 ≤
Rω < ∆, they borrow the minimum of the amount they need to salvage all their assets, kj−ℓj ,
and their borrowing limit, κrkj/R
ω. At Rω = ∆, they are indifferent between borrowing
any amount between 0 and min
{
kj − ℓj , κrkj/∆
}
. Finally, for Rω > ∆, they do not want


























for Rω > ∆. The loan supply schedule of intact agents and the loan demand schedule of
distressed agents are displayed in Figure 1.2. In the right panel, the loan demand curve is

































Fig. 1.3: Regions for spot market equilibrium in state (i, s).
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee that agents do not find it optimal to hoard more liquidity
at date 0 than what is needed to shore up their own entire project were they to become
distressed at date 1. The date 1 spot market equilibrium is therefore simply given by Rω = 1
and dωA = d
ω
B = 0 in state (i, i), and by R
ω = ∆ and dωA = d
ω
B = 0 in state (s, s).
In states of world where one country is intact and the other is distressed, i.e. in (i, s)
and (s, i), the spot market equilibrium can a priori fall in four distinct regions, depending
on where the loan demand and loan supply curves intersect, similarly to Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001). These four types of equilibria are displayed in Figure 1.3.5 As











Tab. 1.1: Regions for equilibrium in state (i, s) or (s, i).
represented in table 1.1, the regions can be categorized according to (a) whether global
liquidity is ample or scarce, and (b) whether the distressed country’s collateral constraint is
slack or binds. When global liquidity is ample (regions I and IV), the equilibrium interest
rate is low: Ris = 1. In region I, the distressed country is constrained, and there is partial
liquidation (θisB = (κrkB+ℓB)/kB < 1). In region IV, the distressed country is unconstrained,
and borrowing is high enough to allow for full continuation and avoid partial liquidation
(θisB = 1). When, on the other hand, global liquidity is scarce (regions II and III), the
equilibrium interest rate rises: Ris > 1. In these regions, all the global liquidity is used
to shore up the distressed country’s assets, but the aggregate shortage of date 1 resources
results in partial liquidation (θisB = (ℓA + ℓB)/kB < 1). In region II, the distressed country
is constrained and can only pledge to offer to lenders a return Ris = κrkB/ℓA, lower than
the social marginal return ∆. In region III, on the other hand, the distressed country is
unconstrained and the lender country can be compensated at the social marginal return of
liquidity in consumption goods terms, Ris = ∆. As is common in models with borrowing
constraints (i.e. Bernanke and Gertler 1989, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997), a wedge between
equilibria in state (s, i) take identical forms, with the subscripts A and B interchanged.
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the internal and external rate of return on investment arises in regions I and II.
The relevant region for equilibrium on the date 1 spot market in states (i, s) and (s, i)
depends on date 0 choices in the two countries. The next section provides conditions on
parameters under which date 0 choices in a competitive equilibrium lead to particular regions.
The focus of the analysis will henceforth be on parameter configurations which lead the
competitive equilibrium to be in region II.
Decentralized equilibrium






πωV ω(kj, ℓj) (1.6)
subject to
kj + ℓj = 1, (1.7)
where the date 1 value function V ω(kj, ℓj) is equal to V
ω
i (kj , ℓj) if the agent is intact and to













together with the date 0 budget constraint (1.7) characterize the agent’s optimal choice.
A competitive equilibrium of the model consists of date 0 decisions (kj, ℓj)j∈{A,B}, date 1
decisions (dωj , θ
ω
j )ω∈Ω,j∈{A,B} and prices (R
ω)ω∈Ω, such that (a) given prices, the decisions
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solve the problems in (1.6), (1.1) and (1.2); and (b) markets clear.6 In what follows, the
values of k and ℓ in a symmetric competitive equilibrium are denoted by kCE and ℓCE.
Assumption 2 guarantees that the probability of a crisis is not large enough to produce
a situation where the aggregate amount of liquidity set aside in a symmetric competitive
equilibrium, 2ℓCE, is sufficient to avoid any liquidation in the states of the world where one
country is intact and the other is distressed. In other words, assumption 2 ensures that
kCE > 2/3 in a symmetric competitive equilibrium. This implies that we can focus on
situations in which only regions I, II or III in states (i, s) and (s, i) can arise in equilibrium.
To gain further insights into the properties of a competitive equilibrium of the model, it
is useful to look at the agents’ value function. In state ω, the value function is given by






for an intact agent, and by









for a distressed agent. The terms in (1.9) are straightforward to interpret. For an intact
agent, illiquid assets yield a return of A, while liquid assets yield a return of Rω, with
1 ≤ Rω ≤ ∆. The marginal value of the illiquid asset in terms of date 2 consumption (rather
than date 2 utility) is higher than that of the liquid asset. The terms in (1.10) are similarly
straightforward. For a distressed agent, each unit of illiquid assets yields a baseline return of
6 The continuation scale of an intact agent is by definition set to θωj = 1.
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r, plus a net return of ∆− Rω on the κr/Rω of external financing raised against collateral,
whereas a unit of liquid assets allows the continuation of one unit of illiquid assets, yielding a
return of ∆. The marginal value of the liquid asset is higher than that of the illiquid asset.7
Given concave utility, from the perspective of period 0 the illiquid asset is a bad hedge, while
the liquid asset is a good hedge.
It turns out that the equilibrium can be further characterized as falling into one of the
aforementioned three regions, depending on the tightness of financial constraints κ. There
are thresholds κ and κ̄, such that
• for κ < κ, the symmetric competitive equilibrium leads to region I, i.e. 2
3
< kCE < 1
1+κr
,










Hence, very tight financial constraints lead to region I, mildly tight constraints lead to
region II, and loose constraints lead to region III. The interest rate in states (i, s) and (s, i)
is pictured as a function of the tightness of financial constraints in Figure 1.4.
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on the case in which the symmetric competitive
equilibrium leads to region II, via the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Tightness of financial constraints). The tightness of financial constraints κ
satisfies κ < κ < κ̄.
7 The marginal value of the illiquid asset for a distressed agent is the highest when Rω = 1, in which case






0 κ κ̄ 1
region I region II region III
Fig. 1.4: Equilibrium interest rate in state (i, s) as a function of κ, in competitive equilibrium.
Assumption 3 guarantees that the symmetric competitive equilibrium leads to the interior
of region II, i.e. that 1
1+κr
< kCE < ∆
∆+κr
. The nature of the date 1 spot market equilibrium
in region II provides a stylized description of actual liquidity crises in a globally integrated
financial system in two key respects: (a) the aggregate shortage of liquidity results in a spike
in the cost of borrowing, and (b) the pervasiveness of financial constraints causes a wedge
between the internal and external marginal value of funds for distressed entities. Importantly,
in this region, the price of liquidity (i.e. the interest rate) is a decreasing function of the
amount of liquidity set aside ex-ante by lenders, and an increasing function of the amount
of illiquid collateral owned by borrowers. Equilibrium in this region therefore captures the
key intuition that the price of liquidity in crises decreases with the supply of it and increases
with the demand for it. A lower ex-ante illiquid investment scale decreases the interest rate
in crises, which benefits distressed borrowers more than it hurts intact lenders at the margin.
Due to the incompleteness of markets, this pecuniary externality causes a market failure:
the date 0 choices in a competitive equilibrium are not constrained efficient, as perturbating
these allocations locally has first-order welfare effects via shifts in interest rates. The failure
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of the competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient motivates the analysis of prudential
regulation from a second best perspective.
1.3 Efficiency and planning problems
In assessing the welfare performance of competitive equilibria in incomplete markets
economies, one is generally interested in whether the market system allocates resources
efficiently given the set of markets operating (see Stiglitz 1982). This section analyzes al-
ternative allocation mechanisms and compares their welfare properties with those of the
decentralized equilibrium described in section 1.2.2. Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 characterize
the allocations resulting from global and national planners making investment decisions sub-
ject to the same set of enforcement and informational frictions as private agents. These
allocation mechanisms are interpreted as regulated equilibria, as in Allen and Gale (2004).
1.3.1 Constrained global planner
Given the presumed failure of the first welfare theorem, it is natural to ask how a con-
strained social planner would want to regulate date 0 investment decisions. To this end, we
start by considering a global planner who maximizes the sum of agents’ expected utility in
the two countries, makes date 0 decisions about k and ℓ instead of private agents in both
countries, and lets the spot market operate competitively at date 1. Importantly, the planner
is assumed to be subject to the same set of informational and enforcement constraints as the
private sector.
Since agents are ex-ante homogenous, the planner is assumed to assign equal weights to
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agents in the two countries when making date 0 choices. The planner’s date 1 value function
Ṽ ω(kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) is given by the sum of the respective expressions in (1.9) and (1.10) in
which the equilibrium interest rate has been substituted in. When the interest rate is not
an explicit function of date 0 choices, as in states (i, i), (s, s), and (i, s)/(s, i) in region I, III
and IV, Ṽ ω(kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) coincides with the sum of the value functions perceived by the
agents in the two countries. But when the interest rate depends explicitly on date 0 choices,
as in states (i, s)/(s, i) in region II, the planner’s value functions are given by






(1− κ)rkB +∆(ℓA + ℓB)
)
, (1.11)
Ṽ si(kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) = u
(







Comparing the expressions in (1.11-1.12) with those in (1.9-1.10), it is apparent that the
global planner’s marginal valuation of the two assets does not coincide with the private
marginal valuation in states (i, s) and (s, i). This result is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Differences in asset valuations between global planner and private agents). In
region II, the global planner values
1. the intact country’s liquid assets more highly than private agents in the state of nature
where the other country is distressed, and
2. the distressed country’s illiquid assets less highly than private agents in the state of
nature where the other country is intact.
Proof. See appendix.
The two results in lemma 1 reflect the fact that the global planner internalizes the effect of
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the two countries’ asset positions on the interest rate in crises, while private agents take this
price as given. The undervaluation of liquid assets by private agents (part 1 of the lemma)
can be traced back to two separate effects. First, the social return in terms of date 2 goods of
a marginal unit of liquid assets in the hands of an intact agent is ∆, but because of binding
financial constraints, intact agents only earn a marginal return of Ris < ∆ in equilibrium.
Second, given concave utility, distressed agents value date 2 resource more highly than intact
agents, so the decrease in the interest rate brought about by an additional marginal unit of
liquidity supply benefits the distressed borrower more than it hurts the intact lender. The
overvaluation of illiquid assets by distressed agents (part 2 of the lemma) relies solely on
this latter wealth redistributive effect. At the margin, a lower stock of illiquid assets for
the distressed country reduces the amount of collateral available for loans, which reduces
the demand for loans and therefore lowers the interest rate. This lowering of the interest
rate transfers wealth from intact lenders to distressed borrowers, and results in a net gain
in social welfare.
The differential asset valuation result emphasized in lemma 1 leads the planner to make
date 0 investment choices that generally differ from those obtained in a competitive equilib-





πωṼ ω(kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) (1.13)
subject to
kj + ℓj = 1 for j ∈ {A,B}. (1.14)
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In other words, the planner makes date 0 choices while anticipating the effect of its decisions
on the determination of the spot market equilibrium at date 1. A globally regulated equi-





prices (Rω)ω∈Ω, such that (a) given prices, the private sector’s decisions solve the problems
in (1.1) and (1.2); (b) the global planner’s decisions solve the problem in (1.13); and (c)
markets clear. For future reference, the levels of k and ℓ chosen by a global planner in a
symmetric optimal plan are denoted by k̃ and ℓ̃.




< k ≤ 1, the
planner’s objective coincides with the private agents’ objectives, since in these regions (I,
III and IV), the interest rate is not a function of date 0 choices locally. Furthermore, under
assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the investment choice kCE in a competitive equilibrium falls in
















. Since over these
latter two intervals, the planner’s and private agents’ objectives are the same, the planner’s



























∂Ṽ ω(k̃, k̃, 1− k̃, 1− k̃)
∂ℓj
⋚ 0 for j ∈ {A,B},
(1.15)
with “≤” if k̃ = 1
1+κr
, with “=” if 1
1+κr
< k̃ < 1
1+κr
and with “≥” if k̃ = ∆
∆+κr
.
Proposition 1 (Excessive illiquidity in competitive equilibrium). A global planner chooses
a more liquid and less risky investment portfolio than private agents in the competitive equi-
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librium, i.e. k̃ < kCE and ℓCE < ℓ̃.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes the constrained inefficiency of decentralized investment decisions
in the model, and provides a characterization of the constrained efficient allocation. At date
1, the global planner’s and private agents’ valuations of the liquid asset coincide in all
states of nature, except in the one where agents lend to distressed foreigners, in which the
planner’s valuation is strictly higher. Similarly, the planner’s and private agents’ valuations
of the illiquid asset coincide in all states, except in the one where agents borrow from intact
foreigners, in which the planner’s valuation is strictly lower. These wedges between the
private and social valuations of the respective assets naturally lead the global planner to
invest more in the liquid asset and less in the illiquid asset at date 0.
Since agents in both countries are ex-ante identical, the welfare metric is unambiguously
given by a representative agent’s expected utility at date 0. This criterion corresponds to
the global planner’s objective, re-scaled by 1/2. Since the planner’s objective is strictly
decreasing in k for k ≥ k̃, welfare is strictly higher under global regulation than in the de-
centralized equilibrium.8 As developed further in section 1.3.3, the global planner recognizes
that a more liquid investment portfolio at date 0 brings about a redistribution of wealth
from intact lenders to distressed borrowers in states (i, s) and (s, i).
Global regulation makes financial crises less severe in two respects. First, there is always
less liquidation during a crisis with global regulation than in the laissez-faire case. In states
of nature where one country is distressed and the other is intact, liquidation is given by





1 − θω = 1 − 2(1− k)/k, while in the state where both countries are distressed, liquidation
is given by 1 − θω = 1 − (1 − k)/k. In both cases, k̃ < kCE implies that there is less
illiquid investment to shore up in a crisis and more available liquid resources to do so under
global regulation than in a decentralized equilibrium. Second, global regulation results in
less pronounced interest rate spikes when one country is hit and the other is not, since
Ris = Rsi = κrk/(1−k). The demand for funds is smaller, and the supply of funds is larger,
resulting in a milder increase in the price of liquidity in a crisis.
1.3.2 Constrained national planners
In order to understand the source of tensions that can arise in an environment where
regulations are set independently in each country, we now consider the case of national
planners who make date 0 decisions in their respective countries and let the spot market
operate competitively at date 1. The assumption that planners are subject to the same
informational and enforcement frictions as private agents is maintained.
The national planners are assumed to maximize the expected utility of domestic agents
when making date 0 choices. Country j planner’s date 1 value function V̂ ω(kj, k−j, ℓj, ℓ−j)
is given by the expression in (1.9) or (1.10) in which the equilibrium interest rate has been
substituted in. As was the case with the global planner, when the interest rate is not an
explicit function of date 0 investment choices, the national planners’ value function coincides
with the private agents’ value function9. But in states (i, s)/(s, i) in region II, where the
9 This is again the case in states (i, i), (s, s), and (i, s)/(s, i) in regions I, III and IV
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interest rate is a function of date 0 choices, the planners’ value functions are given by





V̂ ωs (kj, k−j, ℓj, ℓ−j) = u
(
(1− κ)rkj +∆(ℓ−j + ℓj)
)
. (1.17)
A comparison of the expressions in (1.16-1.17) with those in (1.11-1.12) and (1.9-1.10) reveals
that the national planner’s valuation of the two assets coincides neither with the global
planner’s valuation, nor with the private valuation in states (i, s) and (s, i). These wedges
in valuations are formalized in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 (Undervaluation of assets by national planners vs. global planner). A national
planner values
1. its intact agents’ liquid assets less highly than the global planner in states of nature
where the other country is distressed, and
2. its distressed agents’ illiquid assets less highly than the global planner in states of nature
where the other country is intact.
Proof. See appendix.
The undervaluation of an intact agent’s liquid assets by a national planner vs. the global
planner (part 1 of the lemma) is a consequence of the public goods property of international
liquidity in a crisis. When a country is distressed and the other one is intact, the marginal
value of either country’s liquidity holding accrues entirely to the distressed country. At the
margin, the value of an additional unit of liquid assets for the intact country is thus literally
zero. This somewhat surprising result follows from the fact that an extra unit of liquid
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assets decreases the interest rate at which the intact country is lending in a way that makes
the total revenues from lending abroad insensitive to the intact country’s holdings of liquid














The global planner, on the other hand, values liquid asset holdings by both countries equally
and at their full social returns.
The undervaluation of distressed agents’ illiquid assets by a national planner vs. the
global planner (part 2 of the lemma) also reflects the fact that the distressed and intact
countries share the social value of an additional unit of collateral, with the share depending
on the degree of pledgeability κ. The distressed country’s national planner only captures a
share 1 − κ of the marginal value of the illiquid asset in terms of date 2 goods, and thus
naturally undervalues the illiquid asset.
The undervaluation results for national planners relative to the global planner also hold
vis-a-vis private agents.
Lemma 3 (Undervaluation of assets by national planners vs private agents). A national
planner values
1. its intact agents’ liquid assets less highly than the agents themselves in states of nature
where the other country is distressed, and
2. its distressed agents’ illiquid assets less highly than the agents themselves in states of
nature where the other country is intact.
Proof. See appendix.
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The undervaluation of intact agents’ liquid assets by national planners (part 1 of the
lemma) reflects the fact that national planners internalize the drop in the interest rate caused
by a marginally larger holding of liquid assets, while private agents take interest rates as
given. The undervaluation of distressed agents’ illiquid assets by national planner (part 2 of
the lemma), on the other hand, follows directly from the fact that distressed private agents
overvalue illiquid assets relative to the global planner, while national planners undervalue
illiquid assets relative to the global planner.
Given the wedges in asset valuations between the national planners and the global plan-
ner, it is clear that regulations chosen at the national level will generally not coincide with





πωV̂ ω(kj, k−j, ℓj, ℓ−j) (1.18)
subject to (1.7). National planners make date 0 choices while anticipating the effect of their
decisions on the determination of the spot market equilibrium at date 1, and taking the
action of the other country’s national planner as given. A nationally regulated equilibrium





prices (Rω)ω∈Ω, such that (a) given prices and date 0 decisions, the private sector’s date
1 decisions solve the problems in (1.1) and (1.2); (b) given (k−j, ℓ−j), (kj, ℓj) solves the
problem in (1.18); and (c) markets clear. The levels of k and ℓ chosen by national planners
in a symmetric nationally regulated equilibrium are denoted by k̂ and ℓ̂.





≤ k ≤ 1, the national planners’ objectives coincide with both the private
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agents’ and the global planner’s objective since in these regions the interest rate does not
depend on date 0 choices locally. An argument analogous to that used in section 1.3.1
implies that the national planners’ investment choices in a symmetric nationally regulated







(i.e. in region II). A necessary condition










∂V̂ ω(k̂, k̂, 1− k̂, 1− k̂)
∂ℓj
⋚ 0 for j ∈ {A,B},
(1.19)
with “≤” if k̂ = 1
1+κr
, with “=” if 1
1+κr
< k̂ < 1
1+κr
and with “≥” if k̂ = ∆
∆+κr
.
Proposition 2 (Excessive illiquidity of NRE relative to GRE). National planners choose a
weakly less liquid and more risky investment portfolio than a global planner, i.e. ℓ̂ ≤ ℓ̃ and
k̂ ≥ k̃. Furthermore, if k̂ > 1
1+κr
, then national planners choose a strictly less liquid and
more risky investment portfolio than a global planner, i.e. ℓ̂ < ℓ̃ and k̂ > k̃.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2 had established that national planners (a) undervalue liquid assets when their
country is intact and the foreign country is distressed, and (b) undervalue illiquid assets
when their country is distressed and the foreign country is intact. Proposition 2 states
that unless both equilibria result in a left corner solution (within region II) for the date 0
investment choice (i.e. when k̂ = k̃ = 1
1+κr
), the undervaluation of liquid assets by national
planners dominates the undervaluation of illiquid assets, so that wedges in ex-post valuations
of assets result in an excessive illiquidity of investment by national planners relative to the
constrained efficient allocation. Failing to coordinate macro-prudential policy results in an
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insufficient amount of regulation. In other words, the public goods property of international
liquidity during a crisis translates into a public goods property of prudential regulation.
Since the global planner’s objective is strictly decreasing in k for k ≥ k̃, this insufficient
amount of regulation results in a weakly lower welfare than in the constrained efficient
allocation (strictly lower if k̂ > 1
1+κr
). Insufficient provision of regulation also results in more
liquidation and higher interest rates during financial crises.
Without imposing additional structure on the primitives, the relationship between k̂ and
kCE is ambiguous. It is therefore not a priori clear whether national planners want to hoard
more or less liquidity than private agents in a competitive equilibrium. It turns out that by
putting more structure on preferences, one can obtain the result that national planners want
to hoard less liquidity than private agents, as illustrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Excessive illiquidity of NRE relative to CE). When utility is logarithmic,
national planners choose a less liquid and more risky investment portfolio than private agents
in the competitive equilibrium, i.e. ℓ̂ < ℓCE and k̂ > kCE.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 illustrates that the national planners’ extremely low valuation of liquidity
in the state of nature where its country is intact but the foreign country is distressed can
result in less liquidity and more risk-taking ex-ante than in the laissez-faire benchmark.
This Proposition 3 can be generalized for the class of CRRA utility when the coefficient
of relative risk aversion σ is not too large, i.e. when σ < σ̄, for some σ̄ > 1. Intuitively,
the relationship between k̂ and kCE depends upon two counteracting effects. By hoarding
less liquidity than private agents in a competitive equilibrium, national planners benefit
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from a higher interest rate when their country is intact and lends abroad, but they suffer
from a higher interest rate when their country is distressed and borrows from abroad. The
interest rate is more sensitive to the lender’s supply of liquidity than to borrower’s collateral
(|∂Ris/∂ℓA| > ∂R
is/∂kA), but because of concave utility, goods are more valuable when a
country is distressed and borrowing than when it is intact and lending. When risk-aversion
is low, the utility benefits associated with the first effect dominate: monopoly rents in the
market for liquidity (e.g. in state (i, s) for country A) are more important in utility terms
than monopsony rents (in state (s, i)). National planners therefore find it optimal to set aside
less liquidity than private agents. When risk-aversion is high, the utility costs associated
with the second effect dominate because goods are a lot more valuable in the state where the
country is distressed and borrowing. National planners then find it optimal to set aside more
liquidity than private agents. In the case with low risk-aversion illustrated in Proposition 3,
national planners find it optimal to reduce investment in the liquid asset below what would
be chosen in the free market. This excessive illiquidity results in lower welfare, as measured
by the ex-ante expected utility of a representative agent, than both the constrained efficient
allocation (achieved by global regulation) and the decentralized equilibrium. It also results
in more severe financial crises in the form of more liquidation and larger interest rate spikes.
The underprovision of liquidity in the absence of international coordination can be viewed
as arising from the public goods property international liquidity in crises. Because global
liquidity benefits mainly distressed countries during crises, it is attractive to take advantage
of foreign liquidity provision when one is distressed, but not to provide liquidity to distressed
foreigners when one is intact. Since hoarding liquidity ex-ante is costly in terms of forgone
higher expected returns on long-term projects, in a non-cooperative equilibrium countries
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choose to contribute too little to the pool of international liquidity, and attempt to free-ride
on the foreign contribution. This results in a form of beggar-thy-neighbor policy in the area
of financial regulation.
Viewed through the lens of the literature on international policy coordination, the un-
derprovision of regulation result can be interpreted as arising from the attempt by national
regulators to make use of monopoly and monopsony power in the market for international
liquidity during crises. Regulators recognize that less liquidity hoarding ex-ante results in
liquidity supply being scarcer in the state of nature where their country will be lending to
distressed foreigners. This scarcity is associated with a higher interest rate, and thus brings
about a shift in surplus from foreign borrowers to domestic lenders. Regulators also recognize
that less illiquid investment ex-ante results in liquidity demand being smaller in the state of
nature where their country will be borrowing from intact foreigners. This smaller demand
is associated with a lower interest rate, and thus to a shift in surplus from foreign lenders to
domestic borrowers. Under the assumption of proposition 3, it turns out that the larger sen-
sitivity of the interest rate to liquidity supply by intact agents than to liquidity demand by
distressed agents results in an underinvestment in liquid assets ex-ante by national planners
relative to the laissez-faire benchmark.
Finally, the underprovision of regulation result can be seen as arising from a variation of
the hold-up problem (see Grout 1984 and Tirole 1986). The hold-up problem occurs “when
part of the return on an agent’s relationship-specific investment is ex-post expropriable by
his trading partner” (Che and Sakovics 2008). In the game between national regulators,
the allocation of ex-post surplus is achieved via a competitive spot market rather than via
bargaining. But the fact is that this allocation results in the distressed country expropriating
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part of the return on the ex-ante investment in liquid assets by its trading partner (i.e. the
intact country). As in the classical hold-up problem, this results in an underinvestment in
liquid assets relative to the cooperative solution.
1.3.3 Exchange efficiency and production efficiency
This section offers a conceptual description of the trade-offs faced by a constrained planner
(corresponding to the global planner) when choosing how to set regulations in the present
model. In particular, it shows how the planner’s decision to regulate can be cast into the
management of wedges describing deviations from optimality conditions for exchange and
production efficiency. This discussion clarifies why planners controlling only a subset of the
economy (national planners) are doomed to miss the goal of regulation in such a framework.
It is well known that incomplete markets generally result in a failure of exchange efficiency.
This failure takes the form of wedges between the marginal rates of substitution (MRS)
between two goods across agents. In the model of section 1.2, the relevant MRS is the one




If markets were complete, agents in the two countries would trade securities contingent
on these two states and the MRS would be equalized in a competitive equilibrium. When
markets are incomplete, a wedge between the MRS, indicating a failure of exchange efficiency,
generally persists in equilibrium. For an arbitrary symmetric date 0 investment choice (k, 1−
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It can be shown that τe(k) is monotonically increasing over [0, 1], with τe(0) = 0 and τe(1) =
1− [u′(A)/u′(r)]2. In other words, the higher the investment in the illiquid project, the more
serious the failure of exchange efficiency in this economy. Intuitively, more investment in
illiquid projects leads to more risk, and since markets are incomplete, this higher risk has to
be borne by agents. Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the symmetric competitive equilibrium
falls in region II (i.e. 1
1+κr
< kCE < ∆
∆+κr
















Given that τ ′e(k) > 0, by limiting the investment scale via regulation to k̃ < k
CE, the global
planner reduces the size of the wedge relative to the competitive equilibrium, and thereby
reduces the severity of exchange inefficiency in the economy. Why doesn’t the planner choose
to reduce exchange inefficiency further by lowering the investment scale below k̃? The answer
lies in the trade-off between exchange inefficiency and production inefficiency faced by the







where Rωk and R
ω
ℓ denote the returns on the illiquid and liquid assets, respectively, and c
ω(k)
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denotes a representative agent’s equilibrium consumption in state ω, for a given symmetric
investment choice of k at date 0.10 The production wedge τp is zero at the competitive
equilibrium investment decision kCE and non-zero elsewhere. When lowering the investment
scale down to k̃, a global planner trades off an improvement in exchange efficiency with a
deterioration in production efficiency. Optimal regulation is then the result of the optimal
management of these two wedges by the planner.
The above discussion makes it clear that national planners who have pricing power by
definition cannot be expected to set regulation optimally in an environment where the mo-
tivation to regulate originates from a market incompleteness. National planners do not care
about overall efficiency, but rather attempt to manipulate prices in a way that results in a
shift in surplus in favor of the agents they represent. According to proposition 3, having
them in charge of regulation can even result in a deterioration of both exchange efficiency
- τe(k) is monotonically increasing so τe(k
CE) < τe(k̂) - and production efficiency - τp(k) is
zero only at kCE - vis-a-vis the competitive equilibrium benchmark.







, the expectations in (1.21) are given by
E[Rωk (k)u
′(cωj (k))] = π
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(


















































The model developed in section 1.2 can also be used to study the effects of changes
in macro-prudential policies across borders. Section 1.4.1 analyzes the impact of changes in
macro-prudential policy in one country on risk-taking by market participants abroad. Section
1.4.2 looks at how changes in regulation in one country affect the incentive to regulate in
the other country. Section 1.4.3 studies the welfare effects of a unilateral introduction of
regulation by one of the two countries.
1.4.1 Regulatory spillovers
How do market participants react to changes in macro-prudential policy abroad? To
answer this question, we consider a version of the model of section 1.2 in which the date 0
choices are set exogenously in country B and made optimally by private agents in country
A. A competitive equilibrium with exogenous regulations abroad consists of date 0 decisions




j )ω∈Ω,j∈{A,B} and prices (R
ω)ω∈Ω, such that (a) given prices
and country B regulations (kB, ℓB), the decisions solve the problem in (1.6) for country A,
and the problems in (1.1) and (1.2) for both countries; and (b) markets clear.
To understand the relevant transmission channels of prudential policy across countries,
it is useful to denote the aggregate date 0 investment choices in country j by (Kj, Lj).
While KB and LB are set exogenously by country B’s regulator, KA and LA result from the
optimal choices of private agents in country A. When taking decisions atomistically at date
0, private agents correctly forecast the function mapping aggregate investment choices into
interest rates in the various states of nature at date 1, but they take aggregate investment
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decisions in both countries as given. In the neighborhood of the competitive equilibrium,








Tighter regulations in country B are captured by a marginal decrease in KB and a corre-
sponding marginal increase in LB. The following proposition establishes the direction of the
effect of tighter regulations in country B on private agents’ investment choice in country A.
Proposition 4 (Regulatory spillovers). In the neighborhood of a symmetric competitive
equilibrium, tighter regulations in country B induce private agents in country A to choose a
less liquid and more risky investment portfolio.
Proof. See appendix.
Tighter regulations in country B do not affect private agents’ payoffs in country A in
states (i, i) and (s, s). However, they result in lower interest rates in states (i, s) and (s, i).
In state (i, s), the tighter regulations lead to a smaller demand for funds by country B’s
distressed agents, which pushes down the interest rate at which country A’s intact agents
lend. As can be seen from expression (1.1), this lower interest rate reduces the return on
the liquid asset for country A’s agents in that state. In state (s, i), the tighter regulations
increase the supply of liquidity, which lowers the interest rate at which country A’s distressed
agents borrow. As is clear from expression (1.2), a lower interest rate in this state increases
the return on the illiquid asset for country A’s agents by increasing the wedge between the
internal and external value of funds. Hence, tighter regulations, defined as increasingly pro-
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liquidity regulations, in country B decrease the return on the liquid asset and increase the
return on the illiquid asset for private agents in country A. This naturally leads these agents
to reallocate their investment portfolio towards more illiquid assets.
1.4.2 Spillovers in incentives to regulate
How are a regulator’s incentives affected by a change in macro-prudential policy abroad?
This section shows that the interaction between national regulators in the model of section 1.2
can be understood in terms of the strategic substitutability concept of Bulow, Geanakoplos,
and Klemperer (1985). In light of the result in section 1.4.1 that tighter regulations abroad
induce more risk-taking domestically, one could a priori expect that macro-prudential policies
are strategic complements. In fact, the model delivers precisely the opposite result, as stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Strategic substitutabilities in national regulations). In the neighborhood of
a symmetric competitive equilibrium, national regulations are strategic substitutes.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for this result is that in the neighborhood of the symmetric competitive
equilibrium, the national planners’ payoff functions only depend on the other country’s
investment choices in the states of nature where there is cross-border borrowing and lending,
i.e. in states (i, s) and (s, i). As can be seen from (1.16) and (1.17), a marginal increase in
the tightness of regulations in country −j, in the form of a marginal decrease in k−j and a
corresponding marginal increase in ℓ−j, has the following effects:
• It decreases the interest rate payment κrk−j which country j receives from country
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−j in the state of nature where intact agents in country j lend to distressed agents in






• It increases the loan size ℓ−j which country j receives from country −j in the state
of nature where distressed agents in country j borrow from intact agents in country





, more than it increases the marginal value of investing in the illiquid asset,
(1− κ)ru′
(
(1− κ)r +∆(ℓ−j + ℓj)
)
.
The combination of these two effects makes the relative attractiveness of regulations that
increase investment in liquid assets a decreasing function of the tightness of regulations in
country −j. In other words, these two effects imply that the national regulators’ actions are
strategic substitutes.
1.4.3 Welfare effects of unilateral regulation
The analysis in section 1.3 implies that, starting from a competitive equilibrium, the in-
troduction of a regulation simultaneously requiring agents in both countries to increase their
holdings of liquid assets marginally is unambiguously welfare improving for all agents.11 One
might also be interested in the welfare effects of a unilateral introduction of regulation. In
particular, does such an introduction of regulation increase welfare in the regulated country?
Does it increase welfare in the unregulated country? These are relevant questions to the
extent that their answer determines the incentives of a national regulator to move first in a
11 This follows from the fact that the global planner’s objective is strictly decreasing in k for k ≥ k̃, while
kCE > k̃.
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world where macro-prudential regulations are absent to start with. This section addresses
these questions using the concept of a competitive equilibrium with exogenous regulation
abroad, defined in section 1.4.1.
The focus is on the effects of the introduction of a small regulation requiring country
B agents to increase their holding of liquid assets by dLB = −dKB > 0 relative to the
symmetric competitive equilibrium level ℓCE = 1 − kCE . We consider in turn the welfare
effects in the regulated country and in the unregulated country.
Welfare of regulated country
In a competitive equilibrium with exogenous regulations abroad, country A agents make
their date 0 investment decisions taking prices and foreign regulation as given. In the neigh-
borhood of the symmetric competitive equilibrium, the ex-ante welfare of agents in the
regulated country (country B) is given by
W (LB, ℓA) ≡
∑
ω∈Ω
πωV̂ ω(1− LB, 1− ℓA, LB, ℓA) (1.23)
= πiiu
(












r(1− LB) + ∆LB
)
.
Starting from a symmetric competitive equilibrium, the marginal effect on country B’s wel-












where the derivatives are evaluated at (LB, ℓA) = (ℓ
CE, ℓCE), and dLB > 0. The first term
in the brackets in (1.24) represents the direct effect of a change in regulation. The second
term in the brackets reflects the indirect effect working through the spillovers operating in
country A. Proposition 4 established that a tightening of regulation in country B induced a
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of W (LB, ℓA), evaluated at (ℓ







− πis[(1− κ)r −∆]u′
(























Using the first-order condition of the symmetric competitive equilibrium, gII(k
CE) = 0
(gII(k) is defined in (A.8)),
∂W
∂LB


















Without further restriction, it is not possible to determine the sign of ∂W
∂LB
, so the direct effect
of the tightening of regulation is ambiguous. The tightening of regulation pushes the interest
rate down in the states (i, s) and (s, i) in which there is international borrowing/lending.
In state (i, s), this lowering of the interest rate benefits country B’s agents who can borrow
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more cheaply (first term in (1.27)). In state (s, i), it costs country B’s agents who lend at a
lower rate (second term in (1.27)). Whether the costs are smaller or larger than the benefits
is a priori ambiguous. The direction of the indirect effect, however, is unambiguous. The
proof of lemma 1 establishes that (A+ κ)kCE > [(1− κ)r− 2∆]kCE + 2∆ and therefore the
concavity of u(·) implies ∂W
∂ℓA





in (1.24) is therefore strictly
negative. For country B’s agents, the losses from an increase in the costs of borrowing from
abroad in state (i, s) (the first term in (1.26)) is only partially offset by the benefits of an
increase in the interest rate payment from abroad in state (s, i) (the second term in (1.26)).
A unilateral tightening of regulations in country B induces more risk-taking and illiquidity
abroad, and this feeds back negatively into country B.
With further assumptions, the model implies the direct and the indirect effect work in
the same direction. This results in an unambiguous overall effect of a tightening of regulation
on the regulated country’s welfare, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Beggar-thyself unilateral regulation). Absent initial regulation, when utility
is logarithmic, the unilateral introduction of a (small) regulation is welfare reducing for the




Under log utility, the direct effect of a tightening of regulation on the regulated country’s
welfare is negative , for reasons similar to those underlying the result in proposition 3. In this
case, losses from the extra costs of lending at a lower interest rate in state (s, i) are larger
than the benefits from cheaper borrowing in state (i, s) for country B’s agents.12 While
12 As before, log utility is merely a sufficient condition for direct effect of a change in regulation on the
43
introducing regulation simultaneously at home and abroad is welfare improving for both
countries, a unilateral introduction of regulation can be welfare reducing for the regulated
country, because of terms of trade effects and their associated spillovers. This result is
reminiscent of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), who find that an unexpected unilateral monetary
expansion can be welfare reducing for a given country in an environment where, owing to
monopolistic distortions in production and nominal rigidities, the same policy would be
welfare improving if pursued simultaneously at home and abroad.
Welfare of unregulated country
In the neighborhood of the symmetric competitive equilibrium, the ex-ante welfare of




πωV̂ ω(1− ℓA, 1− LB, ℓA, LB) (1.28)
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.
Starting from a symmetric competitive equilibrium, the marginal effect on country A’s wel-











regulated country’s welfare to work in the same direction as the indirect effects. As for proposition 3, the
proposition can be generalized for CRRA utility when σ < σ̄, for some σ̄ > 1. The result that the overall
effect is negative can be found to hold under less restrictive, albeit not easily characterizable, conditions.
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where the derivatives are evaluated at (ℓA, LB) = (ℓ
CE , ℓCE). The overall effect of a tight-
ening of regulation on the unregulated country’s welfare is again given by the sum of an
indirect effect (first term in (1.29)) and a direct effect (second term in (1.29)). The partial
derivatives of Π(ℓA, LB), evaluated at (ℓA, LB) = (ℓ






































The analysis is facilitated by the fact that locally, the effect a small change in a country’s










). The direct effect of a tightening of regulation on the unregulated
country’s welfare is therefore unambiguously positive, while the direction of the indirect
effect is a priori ambiguous. Perhaps paradoxically, it is the unregulated agents’ response to
the introduction of regulation abroad that may make them worse off than in the absence of
any regulation. Without this behavioral response to the introduction of regulation abroad,
the unregulated country would necessarily be made better off by the decrease in risk-taking
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happening abroad. As before, on can make additional preference assumptions under which
the direct and the indirect effects of the introduction of regulation work in the same direction.
This results in an unambiguously positive overall effect of a tightening of regulation on the
unregulated country’s welfare.
Proposition 7 (Prosper-thy neighbor unilateral regulation). Absent initial regulation, when
utility is logarithmic, the unilateral introduction of a (small) regulation is welfare improving




With logarithmic utility, the unregulated country’s response to the introduction of regu-
lation abroad contributes positively to its welfare. Agents in the unregulated country react
by decreasing their investment in liquid assets and increasing their investment in illiquid
assets. At the margin, the only impact on their welfare works through the marginal increase
in the interest rate in states (i, s) and (s, i) resulting from this portfolio reallocation. The
benefits from lending abroad at a higher rate in state (i, s) is larger than the cost of paying
a higher rate of foreign loans in state (s, i). A unilateral regulation may therefore create
prosper thy-neighbor effects via both the direct and indirect channels.
1.5 An asset market formulation
This section presents a variant of the model of section 1.2 in which the intermediation of
funds during a crisis occurs via an asset market rather than via a credit market. Distressed
agents cannot borrow at date 1, but they can sell some of their illiquid assets to intact agents
in order to raise funds. When variables are appropriately relabeled, the date 1 equilibrium
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of this model is isomorphic to the date 1 equilibrium of the credit market model of section
1.2. All the results of sections 1.3.1 to 1.4 derived for the credit market model therefore also
apply to the asset market model of the present section.
As in the baseline model of section 1.2, markets are incomplete. However, instead of
being able to share risk indirectly by borrowing and lending on a credit market at date 1,
agents are now able to buy and sell the illiquid asset on a spot market at a price qω. Intact
agents buy xωj , while distressed agents sell −x
ω
j . We assume that sellers cannot sell more
than a fraction η of their total capital holdings kj. This amounts to assuming limited market
liquidity for long-term projects, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). We further assume that
the long-term projects that are traded need to be shored up by distressed agents before being
delivered to a buyer. Buyers of illiquid projects at date 1 therefore receive Axωj at date 2.
All other assumptions of section 1.2.1 pertaining to preferences, technology and uncertainty
are maintained.
At date 1, the value of an intact agent in country j is now given by











The agent’s date 2 consumption in (1.30) is given by the sum of the return on its initial
holding of illiquid projects Akj, the return on the newly acquired illiquid projects Ax
ω
j and
the return on the funds invested at date 1 in the storage technology ℓj − q
ωxωj . Without loss
of generality, we assume that intact agents can only buy and not sell assets on the date 1
spot market. Their capacity to buy is limited by their date 1 liquid resources ℓj .
As in the model of section 1.2, the form of the objective in (1.30) leads to a simple asset
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demand schedule for intact agents. For qω < A, intact agents exhaust their budget constraint
and are willing to buy ℓj/q
ω units of the long-term asset. For qω = A, they are indifferent
between buying any amount between 0 and ℓj/A. Finally, for q
ω > A, they do not want to
buy any long-term assets. The intact agents’ asset demand curve is therefore horizontal at
qω = A and slopes downward for qω < A, as shown in figure 1.5.
The date 1 value of a distressed agent in country j is given by






r(1− θωj )kj + A(θ
ω
j kj + x
ω







θωj kj ≤ −q
ωxωj + ℓj , (1.32)
−xωj ≤ ηkj, (1.33)
A distressed agent’s date 2 consumption in (1.31) is given by the sum of the return on the
long-term assets that were not shored up, r(1 − θωj )kj, the return on the long-term assets
that were shored up but not sold A(θωj kj +x
ω
j ), and the return on the funds invested at date
1 in the storage technology ℓj − q
ωxωj − θ
ω
j kj. (1.32) is the date 1 budget constraint stating
that reinvestment θωj kj needs to be covered by the sum of ex-ante liquidity hoarding ℓj and
proceeds of ex-post sale of assets −qωxωj . (1.33) says that distressed agents cannot resell
more than a fraction η of their initial long-term asset holdings kj.
The form of the objective in (1.31) again yields a simple form for a distressed agent’s
asset supply schedule. For qω < A/∆, an agent does not want to sell any assets, since the
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revenue from a sale is lower than the cost of shoring up the asset. At qω = A/∆, an agent
is indifferent between selling any amount it can. Finally, for qω > A/∆, an agent wants to
sell as much as possible. The distressed agents’ asset supply curve is therefore horizontal at
qω = A/∆ and vertical at ηkj for q
ω > A/∆.
Asset market clearing requires xωA + x
ω
B = 0. The equilibrium asset price necessarily
satisfies A/∆ ≤ qω ≤ A. The equilibrium is simply given by qω = A/∆ and xωA = x
ω
B = 0
in state (i, i), and by qω = A and xωA = x
ω
B = 0 in state (s, s). When country j is intact
and country −j is distressed (i.e. in states (i, s) and (s, i)), under the condition that A/∆ <
ℓj
ηk−j
< A, the equilibrium takes the form displayed in Figure 1.5, and equating the asset
demand ℓj/q





The equilibrium features cash-in-the-market pricing, as in Allen and Gale (1998), in that
the asset price depends positively on the amount of liquidity in the hands of the intact
country’s buyers. A marginal increase in the amount of liquidity set aside ex-ante by intact
agents would push up the asset price by increasing the demand for the asset (shifting the
downward sloping part of the demand curve to the right). The equilibrium also exhibits fire
sales in that the asset price depends negatively on the amount of illiquid assets thrown on
the market by the distressed country’s sellers. A marginal decrease in the amount of ex-ante
illiquid investment by distressed agents would push up the asset price by reducing the supply
of the asset (shifting the vertical portion of the supply curve to the left). Naturally, such













Fig. 1.5: Asset market equilibrium in state (i, s).
interest rate in the model of section 1.2.
In equilibrium, the date 1 value function of an intact agent is given by








and that of a distressed agent is given by
V ωs (kj , ℓj) = u
(
r(1− η)kj +∆(q
ω − 1)ηkj +∆ℓj
)
. (1.36)
(1.35) indicates that for an intact agent, illiquid assets yield a return of A, while liquid
assets, by allowing the purchase at price qω of assets that have an ultimate return of A, yield
a return of A/qω. The terms in (1.36) can be interpreted similarly. For a distressed agent,
each unit of liquid assets allows shoring up one unit of illiquid assets, yielding a return ∆,
whereas each unit of illiquid assets yields a return of r for the share 1 − η that cannot be
sold off, and a return of ∆(qω − 1) for the share η that can be sold off (an asset sale brings
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an extra qω − 1 of date 1 liquidity, whose return is ∆).
A remarkable aspect of the asset market equilibrium is its complete isomorphism with
the credit market equilibrium of the model of section 1.2. For η = κr
A
, the equilibrium of
the asset market model corresponds exactly to the equilibrium of the credit market model,
when prices are redefined according to Rω = A
qω
. When η < η < η̄, for η = κr
A
and η̄ = κ̄r
A
,
date 0 decisions in a symmetric competitive equilibrium result in the date 1 asset market
equilibrium taking the form displayed in Figure 1.5. The results derived in sections 1.3.1 to
1.4 for the credit market model therefore automatically also apply to the asset market model
of this section. This illustrates that the coordination problem between national regulatory
authorities that is at the core of this paper does not rely on a particular specification of the
market allowing distressed entities to raise funds during a crisis. In the asset market version
of the model, global regulation calls for more investment in liquid assets and less investment
in illiquid assets ex-ante, with the aim of supporting asset prices during financial crises.
Marginally higher asset prices in a crisis redistribute wealth from intact buyers to distressed
sellers, and thereby achieve a reduction in the cross-sectional wedges between marginal rates
of substitution between goods in states (i, s) and (s, i). National planners do not aim at a
reduction of these wedges, but rather try to shift surplus in favor of domestic residents, by
pushing down the asset price in states where their residents are buying the asset and pushing
it up in states where the residents are selling the asset.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the international coordination problem inherent to the financial sta-
bility objective of banking regulation. It presents a model of systemic risk-taking where the
stabilization benefits of macro-prudential regulation are global, but the costs of regulation
stemming from distortions in production are incurred domestically. Absent coordination,
this public goods problem naturally results in an underprovision of regulation.
Our findings have implications far beyond the framework of the particular model ana-
lyzed. They illustrate that when where pecuniary externalities operate across borders, there
is a strong case for cooperation in policies whose underlying motivation is to correct such
externalities. Hence, they imply that the case for international coordination extends to a
large part of the growing research agenda that motivates financial crisis prevention policies
from a second best perspective in incomplete markets environments (see reviews in Wagner
2009 and Korinek 2011a). The quantitative relevance of the implied coordination problem
is likely to depend on the particular frictions and policies under scrutiny, and its assessment
is an important area for future research.
At a more abstract level, the paper also shows that, contrary to common beliefs, mar-
ket power can increase the magnitude of the distortions induced by systemic externalities.
Whether market power attenuates or amplifies these distortions crucially depends on the di-
rection of the relevant pecuniary externalities. The non-trivial interplay between distortions
arising from market incompleteness and those due to non-competitive market structures is
another fruitful avenue for future research.
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2. SYSTEMIC RISK AND INEFFICIENT DEBT MATURITY
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 global financial crisis has shown that liquidity problems, originally con-
fined to a relatively small number of economic entities, can spread out rapidly. Through
vicious spirals, liquidity shortages can lead to sudden losses of confidence in markets, caus-
ing massive asset price drops and cutbacks in bank lending. In the run-up to the crisis,
highly leveraged entities, such as investment banks, hedge funds and off-balance-sheet vehi-
cles, relied increasingly on very short-term liabilities to fund long-term assets. This trend is
believed to have been a major factor behind the liquidity crunch that led to the unprece-
dented financial turmoil of 2008-2009 (Brunnermeier 2009). Was this widespread maturity
mismatch just the efficient aggregate result of sound choices made by individually rational
agents? Or was it in some sense excessive, in which case government intervention would have
been warranted? This paper investigates this question by assessing within a quantitative the-
oretical framework the desirability of government policies that alter the debt maturity choice
of leveraged economic agents.
In the wake of the recent crisis, academic economists, policymakers and observers have
increasingly pushed for a broad reform of financial regulation.1 Central to the proposed
1 See, for example, The Group of Thirty (2009), Bank of England (2009) and Warwick Commission (2009).
reforms are macroprudential policies designed to limit behavior of market participants that
tends to increase the whole financial system’s vulnerability – so-called systemic risk. In
addition to proposals to penalize high leverage and large institution sizes, most calls for new
macroprudential regulations also suggest taxing large maturity mismatches.2 But because
of the general presumption that decentralized markets produce socially optimal outcomes
through the “invisible hand,” government interventions often need to be justified by the
identification of a specific form of market failure. In our context, the market failure results
from a “fire-sale externality” that causes excessive leverage and risk-taking by borrowers.
Individual agents fail to internalize that by building up leverage and choosing a high risk
exposure, they increase the likelihood of having to fire-sell assets beyond what would be
socially desirable, thereby excessively depressing asset prices and tightening others’ financing
constraints in the event of adverse aggregate shocks.
This paper studies the debt maturity choice of leveraged agents in a formal framework
where endogenous collateral constraints are a source of amplification of fundamental shocks.
Long-term debt provides insurance against negative shocks to the value of assets held by
leveraged borrowers, but it entails an extra cost over short-term debt because lenders need
to be compensated for spending resources on enforcing long-term contracts. Borrowers choose
their debt maturity by trading off the insurance benefits of long-term debt with its costs.
But as they fail to internalize their contribution to systemic risk, they only consider the
private insurance benefits of long-term debt and take on too little of it (i.e. they take on too
much short-term debt) in a decentralized market equilibrium. In such an environment, where
2 See Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) and the Squam Lake Working Group
on Financial Regulation (2009).
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the stability of leveraged borrowers’ net worth has “public goods” properties, government
intervention in the form of a tax on short-term debt can lead to Pareto improvements and
result in less volatile allocations and asset prices.
We consider a model with two sets of agents and introduce financial frictions, as those play
a key role in the formal and informal analysis of systemic risk and macroprudential policy.
The modeling framework builds on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Relatively patient agents
(households) lend in equilibrium to less patient agents (entrepreneurs). Capital serves both as
a factor of production and as collateral for loans. When the only type of claim that agents can
trade is a one-period non-state-contingent bond, entrepreneurs are naturally more exposed to
aggregate risk (productivity shocks) than households because of leverage. A negative shock
disproportionately hurts the net worth of entrepreneurs, leading them to reduce borrowing
and fire-sell assets. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), fundamental shocks get amplified as
these fire-sales lead to a further decline in asset prices and net worth, causing yet another
round of deleveraging. By letting agents trade long-term bonds alongside the usual one-
period non-state-contingent bonds, we allow for the possibility of better risk-sharing between
households and entrepreneurs. Even though long-term bonds are a promise to non-state-
contingent payments, their one-period return is state-contingent since the market price of
the future payment stream generally depends on aggregate conditions, as in Angeletos (2002)
and Buera and Nicolini (2004). Since the prices of both long-term bonds and physical assets
are pro-cyclical, the issuance of long-term debt by borrowers (entrepreneurs) effectively shifts
risk towards lenders (households). A longer debt maturity structure thus translates into a
lower relative risk exposure of leveraged entrepreneurs. When adverse shocks hit, the value
of the entrepreneurs’ assets shrinks, but so does the value of their liabilities, which mitigates
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the effect on their net worth. By reducing the sensitivity of leveraged entrepreneurs’ net
worth’s to fundamental shocks, a longer debt maturity structure also reduces the scope of
financial amplification in the economy, resulting in less volatile allocations and asset prices.
In this environment where a shorter debt maturity maps into more volatile aggregate eco-
nomic variables, we ask whether debt maturity choices made by individually rational agents
result in socially efficient risk allocations. Short-term debt is cheaper than long-term debt,
partly because in the model enforcing long-term contracts is costly. In choosing their debt
maturity, entrepreneurs hence trade-off the private insurance benefits of long-term debt with
the cost advantage of short-term debt. But since (1) lower net worth causes fire sales, (2) fire
sales depress the price of capital, and (3) the price of capital matters for other entrepreneurs’
borrowing capacity, the social insurance benefits of long-term debt outweigh its private ben-
efits. As a result of this pecuniary externality in an incomplete market setting, entrepreneurs
issue too much short-term debt and too little long-term debt in a decentralized equilibrium.
We show that a constant tax on short-term debt can lead to Pareto improvements and less
volatile aggregate economic variables by inducing entrepreneurs to rely on longer-term fund-
ing. In fact, in our model entrepreneurs are better off even when the proceeds of the tax are
wasted in unproductive expenditures instead of being rebated lump-sum.
The paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to a broad
theoretical literature in corporate finance and banking that analyzes debt maturity choice in
partial equilibrium. For the most part, this literature attempts to rationalize the empirical
prevalence of short-term debt in the financial and non-financial corporate sector. Flannery
(1986) and Diamond (1991) argue that short-term debt issuance can act as a signaling device
in frameworks with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Diamond and
56
Dybvig (1983) rationalize demandable debt as an efficient mechanism to deal with depositors’
exposure to liquidity shocks, while Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan
(2001) emphasize the incentive roles of short-term debt in environments with moral hazard.
In contrast to this literature, the present paper stresses undesirable aspects of short-term
debt and argues that too much of it may be issued in decentralized markets.
The second literature to which this paper relates is the macroeconomic literature on finan-
cial amplification or financial accelerator effects, which analyzes the role of financial frictions
in general equilibrium. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show
that in the presence of financial frictions, endogenous variations in borrowers’ net worth
can lead to amplification of fundamental economic shocks. The formal modeling framework
adopted in this paper shares several aspects of the quantitative theoretical implementations
of these ideas by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Ia-
coviello (2005), Mendoza and Smith (2006) and others. On the normative side, Lorenzoni
(2008) and Bianchi (2009) find that individual agents may overborrow as they do not in-
ternalize the tightening of financing conditions they impose on other agents through their
subsequent deleveraging in the event of bad shocks. Korinek (2009) finds that atomistic
agents in emerging markets may rely excessively on dollar debt, as they do not internalize
the pressure put on the exchange rate through their cut in aggregate demand during finan-
cial crises, and Korinek (2011b) argues more generally that agents choose excessively risky
financial structures in the presence of financial accelerator effects. This paper complements
this body of research by showing that the debt maturity chosen by constrained borrowers in
a decentralized equilibrium can be socially inefficient and can result in excessively volatile
allocations and asset prices.
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Finally, the paper also relates to a literature that analyzes the maturity structure of
capital flows to emerging markets. Paralleling the results of the corporate finance papers
mentioned above, Rodrick and Velasco (1999), Tirole (2003) and Jeanne (2009) argue that
short-term debt can act as a disciplining device for opportunistic sovereign borrowers, al-
though the latter recognize that under some circumstances, short-term debt accumulation by
private agents can be socially excessive. Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2008) explain
emerging market governments’ reliance on short-term debt by appealing to international
lenders’ risk aversion and fluctuations thereof. Like most of the corporate finance literature,
the analysis in these papers is based on heavily stylized 3-period partial equilibrium models.
In contrast, the present paper studies the positive and normative implications of debt matu-
rity choices in a tractable infinite horizon dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework
with risk averse borrowers and lenders.
The environment is presented in Section 2.2 and the competitive equilibrium is defined
and characterized in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses the rationale for macroprudential
policy. Section 2.5 presents the quantitative results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider an environment, inspired by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), with two sets of
agents - households and entrepreneurs - and one source of (aggregate) risk. Both types of
agents are risk-averse consumers and derive benefits from a physical asset. Entrepreneurs,
who for modeling purposes are assumed to be less patient, borrow from households in equilib-
rium, and produce the consumption good out of the physical asset and labor using a constant
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returns to scale technology. Households supply labor and savings to the entrepreneurial sec-
tor, and use the physical asset for home production. Financial markets are both imperfect
and incomplete. In addition to an enforcement friction that underlies a collateral constraint
faced by borrowers, asset markets are exogenously assumed to be incomplete in that agents
are only allowed to trade short-term and long-term non-state-contingent bonds. Short-term
bonds are one-period non-state-contingent bonds, while long-term bonds are modeled as a
perpetuity. Note that although the cash flows attached to a long-term bond are non-state-
contingent, the one-period rate of return on this bond is state-contingent, as the price of
long-term bonds generally varies with economic conditions. The presence of long-term bonds
therefore creates risk-sharing opportunities in the economy by enabling agents to form bond
portfolios with state-contingent returns. There are two goods: a consumption good and a
capital good. The consumption good is perishable, while capital is in fixed supply and does
not depreciate.
Households. There is a unit mass of identical infinitely-lived households in the economy.





where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on period 0 information, β is a discount fac-
tor, u(·) is a constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) period utility function for consumption,
G(·) is an increasing and convex labor disutility function, Ct denotes period t consump-
tion, and Lt denotes period labor supply. Households can invest in physical capital used to
operate a home production technology. We assume that home production output received
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in period t depends on the stock of physical capital carried over into period t + 1, Kt+1.
This amounts to assuming that physical assets are traded cum-dividend. Households can
also choose to invest in short-term bonds and long-term bonds. qSt denotes the price of the
short-term (discount) bond. Similarly, qLt denotes the price of the long-term bond, which
entitles its holder to payments of one unit of the consumption good in every future period
until infinity. The return on holding short-term bonds between t and t + 1 is known in t,
while the one-period return on holding long-term bonds is state-dependent, because the t+1
market value of the remaining payment stream of a perpetuity depends on the state of the
economy. A representative household chooses sequences of consumption, capital, short-term
bonds and long-term bonds to maximize expected lifetime utility subject to the following
period budget constraint:








t+1 = AtF (Kt+1) + wtLt + qtKt +B
S







where F (·) is an increasing and concave home production function, qt is the price of capital, wt
is the wage rate, BSt is the household’s holding of short-term bonds, B
L
t is its holding of long-
term bonds, and ϑ represents a monitoring cost which long-term bond holders must incur each
period to prevent borrowers from absconding with the remaining stream of payments due.3
3 In our numerical solution, in order to preserve a meaningful bond portfolio choice even as the stochastic
noise in the model approaches zero, we assume that this cost is of second-order, i.e. that ϑ ≡ (ǫϑt )
2, where
ǫϑt is a zero-mean i.i.d. random variable with variance σ
2
ϑ of the same order of magnitude as the variance of
shocks to TFP. The assumption that the monitoring cost is stochastic is made for technical reasons only and
affects the equilibrium dynamics only at third- and higher orders. Because of the presence of portfolio choice,
we solve the model by approximating the decision rules around a deterministic steady state to which the
allocations and prices converge when the scale of the stochasticity become arbitrary small. If the monitoring
cost was a constant independent of that scale, the bond portfolio choice would be trivial in the limit: as the
insurance benefits of long-term debt depend on the scale of TFP shocks but the monitoring costs are kept
fixed, for arbitrarily small TFP shocks, short-term contracts would strictly dominate long-term contracts.
By making monitoring costs stochastic, we are able to maintain a non-trivial trade-off between short- and
long-term debt, even as the scale of the stochastic noise approaches zero, through effectively stabilizing the
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Further, as monitoring activities generally result in unproductive expenditures, we assume
that the monitoring cost is a resource cost. Consequently, short-term debt contracts have a
relative advantage over long-term debt contracts in that they avoid the need for unproductive
monitoring activities. From both a private and a social perspective, this implies a trade-off
between the insurance (risk-sharing) benefits of long-term debt and the cost advantage of
short-term debt.4 Section 2.3.2 offers a detailed discussion of individual agents’ bond/debt
maturity choice in the model.




























(2.1) describes optimal labor supply, while (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are standard Euler equations
characterizing the household’s optimal holdings of the physical asset, short-term bonds and
long-term bonds.
Entrepreneurs. There is a continuum of mass one of identical entrepreneurs with infinite
horizon. Entrepreneurs consume and operate a technology which produces consumption
relationship between the costs and benefits of long-term debt.
4 Kiyotaki and Moore (2003, 2005) consider a setup where borrowers need to pay a deadweight securitiza-
tion cost to ensure the future liquidity (resellability) of long-term claims, putting forward the argument that
multilateral commitment to repay debt is generally more demanding than bilateral commitment (the later
being the only type of commitment relevant for short-term debt issuance). This securitization cost increases
the cost of borrowing long-term. Our monitoring cost ϑ puts the burden of costly contract enforcement on
the lender but achieves the same effect.
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goods out of physical capital and labor inputs. To make entrepreneurs borrow in equilibrium,
we assume that they discount the future more strongly than households. Each entrepreneur
faces a collateral constraint which limits the value of his total debt to a multiple of the value
of the capital he holds.5 As developed below, this collateral constraint can be interpreted
as an incentive compatibility constraint in an environment with enforcement frictions.6 The
lower discount factor ensures that entrepreneurs remain financially constrained in the long





where γ is a discount factor satisfying γ < β, and ct denotes period t consumption. The
entrepreneur’s period budget constraint is given by








t+1 = Atf(kt+t, lt)− wtlt + qtkt + b
S





where kt is the entrepreneur’s holding of physical capital, lt is the hired labor, b
S
t is his
holding of short-term bonds, bLt is his holding of long-term bonds, and f(·) is a constant
returns to scale production function.7
5 Given a lower discount factor, in the absence of limits on their borrowing, entrepreneurs would accumu-
late debt to a point where their long-run consumption would converge towards zero.
6 Note that, in principle, households are subject to the same enforcement friction as entrepreneurs and
should therefore face the same collateral constraint. However, given their higher discount factor, households
will turn out to be lenders and not borrowers in equilibrium. Imposing a borrowing constraint in their
decision problem would thus be superfluous.
7 We omit the monitoring cost in the budget constraint, because entrepreneurs will end up being issuers
of long-term bonds in equilibrium (bLt < 0), and monitoring costs are borne by lenders (households).
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t+1 ≤ κqtkt+1. (2.5)
This constraint limits the total value of outstanding debt to a fraction of the value of capital
held by a borrower. It is akin to the collateral constraints in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and as in these papers it has the potential to generate financial
amplification effects through the impact of asset price changes on agents’ borrowing capacity.
We interpret the constraint as arising from a limited enforcement problem, but refrain from
modeling its micro-economic foundation explicitly.
A representative entrepreneur chooses sequences of consumption, capital, short-term
bonds and long-term bonds to maximize expected life-time utility subject to a sequence
of period budget constraints and collateral constraints. Optimal behavior by entrepreneurs
is characterized by the following four conditions
Atfl(kt+1, lt) = wt (2.6)
qtu
′(ct) = Atfk(kt+1, lt)u
′(ct) + γEt [qt+1u



























(2.6) describes entrepreneurs’ labor demand, while (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) are conventional
Euler equations for capital, short-term bonds and long-term bonds. From (2.8) and (2.9) we
see that the borrowing constraint can induce a wedge between the current marginal value
of wealth and the discounted expected value of next period’s marginal value of wealth. It
is also apparent from (2.7) that when the collateral constraint binds, entrepreneurs value
capital more highly as it helps relax the constraint.
Fundamentals. TFP is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process
log(At) = ρ log(At−1) + ǫ
A
t ,




























t . A competitive equilibrium of the model can then be defined
by sequences of state-contingent allocations {ct, Ct, lt, Lt, bt+1, Bt+1,Φt+1, φt+1, kt+1, Kt+1}
∞
t=0






t=0 such that: (a) households maximize expected lifetime utility
subject to their sequence of budget constraints, taking as given prices and initial conditions
(B0,Φ0, K0), (b) entrepreneurs maximize expected lifetime utility subject to their sequence
of budget and collateral constraints, taking as given prices and initial conditions (b0, φ0, k0),
8 At a technical level and for the purpose of solving the model, a second source of uncertainty in the
economy arises from monitoring costs. For the purpose of solving the model, we assume that ǫϑt is an i.i.d.
random variable with variance σ2ϑ. Given the retained formulation, up to a second-order of accuracy the
realizations of this shock have no effect on the equilibrium dynamics of the model’s variables. The presence of
the monitoring cost (but not the realizations of ǫϑt ) is nonetheless a key determinant of debt/bond maturity
choices.
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and (c) the markets for labor, short-term bonds, long-term bonds and capital clear9:
Lt = lt,
bt+1 − φt+1 +Bt+1 − Φt+1 = 0,
φt+1 + Φt+1 = 0,
kt+1 +Kt+1 = K̄,
where K̄ is the fixed supply of capital in the economy.
We quantitatively analyze the dynamics of the model in the neighborhood of a deter-
ministic steady state to which competitive equilibrium allocations and prices converge when
the scale of the stochastic noise in the model becomes arbitrarily small. Even though the
maturity structure is not uniquely determined in the deterministic steady state, as short-
and long-term bonds are perfect substitutes in the absence of stochastic shocks, the other
“non-portfolio” variables are uniquely pinned down. By focusing our attention on the lo-
cal dynamics of the model, we assume that the entrepreneur’s collateral constraint always
binds.10
2.3.1 Deterministic steady state
We consider a deterministic steady state in which long-term debt enforcement is costless
(ϑ = 0). From the household’s Euler equations for short term and long term bonds, the
bond prices are given by qS = β and qL = β/(1 − β). The gross interest rates on these
9 Goods market clearing then follows from Walras’ law.
10 In simulations, we find that the shadow price of this constraint remains positive in each of the 100,000
periods.
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two bonds are thus equal and given by rS = rL = β−1. Given that the two bonds have the
same deterministic returns in the steady state, they are indistinguishable. This illustrates
why the agents’ debt portfolios are not uniquely pinned down in the absence of stochastic
shocks and monitoring costs. From the entrepreneur’s Euler equations (2.8) or (2.9), we have
µ = (1− γ/β)u′(c) > 0, meaning that the entrepreneurs are constrained in the deterministic




β(1− β) + (β − κ)(β − γ)
Afk(k, l) (2.11)
This expression illustrates that as long as κ 6= β, capital is allocated inefficiently in the
deterministic steady-state. In the realistic case where κ < β, the marginal product of capital
is higher in the entrepreneurial sector than in the household sector.
2.3.2 Costs and benefits of long-term debt
The central point of the paper is that debt maturity choices made by individually rational
agents in an environment where financial frictions give rise to amplification effects are not
necessarily efficient. In particular, in this model, debt contracts can have an excessively
short maturity. It is thus worth clarifying the precise elements that affect the agents’ debt
maturity choices in the model.


















From these expressions, it can be recognized that fluctuations in households’ consumption
resulting from aggregate shocks will be associated with co-movements in the prices of capital
and long-term bonds due to fluctuations in the common stochastic discount factor. A pos-
itive TFP shock will lead to higher current household consumption (via higher wages and
higher home production), lower current household marginal utility of consumption, and thus
in equilibrium to higher prices of capital and long-term bonds.11 At the same time, leveraged
entrepreneurs who fund part of their capital holdings with debt are highly exposed to aggre-
gate shocks: not only do they suffer from less productive capital when a bad shock hits, but
they are also hurt by the asset price drop associated with the scarcity of current resources.
Figure 2.1 represents stylized balance sheets of leveraged borrowers (entrepreneurs) in the
cases with and without long-term debt. When only short-term debt is available, the market
value of the debt is predetermined, while the value of the assets is state contingent. This
results in a high sensitivity of entrepreneurs’ net worth to aggregate shocks. When long-
term debt is also available, the value of the debt is state-contingent, since the market price
of the future payment stream attached to long-term debt depends on current conditions. In
particular, the market value of the debt rises in good times and shrinks in bad times. Issuing
long-term debt thus provides entrepreneurs with a hedge against fluctuations in the value of
their assets. Equivalently, it allows entrepreneurs to pass on to households some of the risk
to which they are naturally exposed.
11 The strength of the price responses will depend, among other things, on how much households are























Short- and long-term debt
Fig. 2.1: Balance sheets of leveraged entrepreneur.
To which extent will private agents make use of the risk-sharing opportunity provided
by long-term debt contracts? This will depend on the premium on long-term debt charged
by lenders. In the absence of costly enforcement of long-term contracts (when ϑ = 0), this
premium will correspond to a pure term premium: since the return on long-term bonds is
positively correlated with lenders’ consumption in equilibrium, lenders will demand com-
pensation for holding these bonds. Borrowers will then trade-off the insurance benefits of
long-term debt with its extra cost, and choose a debt maturity such that those two are
equalized. When the enforcement of long-term contracts is costly (ϑ > 0), lenders will re-
quire compensation for holding long-term bonds beyond what can be attributed to a pure
term premium. In effect, lenders will pass on the burden of costly enforcement to borrowers,
since in equilibrium they need to be indifferent at the margin between saving in short- and
long-term bonds. Faced with this higher cost of long-term debt, borrowers will generally
choose debt maturity structures shorter than what they would choose in the absence of
costly enforcement of long-term contracts. From a social perspective, short-term debt has
an advantage in that it avoids the waste of resources in unproductive monitoring activities.
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Our model thus captures in a reduced form the incentive benefits of short-term debt put
forward by Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and others. A contribution of our paper is then to
show that the market can fail to produce allocations that efficiently balance the trade-off
between the risk-sharing benefits of long-term debt and the cost advantage of short-term
debt.
2.3.3 Analytical results
It turns out that when enforcement of long-term debt is costless (ϑ = 0), the availability
of short- and long-term bonds results in competitive equilibrium allocations that achieve an
efficient degree of risk-sharing. This is because in spite of borrowing constraints, short- and
long-term bonds can provide agents with a very valuable hedge. In the absence of bonds with
state-contingent returns, entrepreneurs are more exposed to risk than households because of
their leveraged positions: they finance part of their capital holdings with debt and therefore
tend to suffer more in the event of a negative TFP shock (which depresses the price of
the capital). But given the state-contingent nature of the returns on long-term bonds,
entrepreneurs can insure against fluctuations in the value of their capital by going short
on long-term bonds, i.e. by issuing long-term debt, while going long on short-term bonds.
Indeed, under some conditions, this opportunity results in a fully efficient allocation of risk
between households and entrepreneurs, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8. When agents have log utility, TFP is serially uncorrelated and enforcement
of long-term debt is costless (i.e. when ϑ = 0), risk markets are effectively complete. As
a result, aggregate risk is shared equally by households and entrepreneurs, and the wealth
distribution is time-invariant. Furthermore, the entrepreneur’s collateral constraint always
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binds, the capital allocation is fixed at its deterministic steady state value (i.e. fire sales
never occur) and the economy displays no persistence.
Proof. See appendix C.
The intuition for the effective completeness of risk markets comes from the fact that
when long-term debt enforcement is costless, under log utility and serially uncorrelated
TFP, the capital and bond prices are all linear functions of the single state variable (TFP).
It is therefore possible to construct a bond portfolio whose fluctuations in value match
exactly the changes in the relative wealth distribution caused by fluctuations in TFP under
asymmetric holdings of capital. The result is similar to the ones in Angeletos (2002) and
Buera and Nicolini (2004), who find that a government can use non-contingent debt of
different maturities to achieve complete markets Ramsey allocations. Our result requires a
more stringent restriction on preferences than theirs, but puts less demand on asset markets:
complete markets in these papers generally requires debt instruments of as many maturities
as possible states of nature, while our result holds for an arbitrarily large number of states
and just two maturities.
We view the equal sharing of aggregate risk as an efficient outcome, given identical risk
tolerances and the CRRA property of the log utility function. The constant relative risk
aversion makes the desired risk-exposure of agents independent of their wealth levels, so it
is socially desirable to let households and entrepreneurs share aggregate risk equally, even
though the former are wealthier than the later. A remarkable aspect of proposition 1 is that
perfect risk sharing is achieved despite the presence of a collateral constraint, which a priori
puts restrictions on the trade of the available financial claims.
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The no fire sales outcome also represents a strong result. In the presence of short-term
debt only, as in the generic model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), aggregate shocks relax or
tighten leveraged borrowers’ constraints, and result in them increasing or decreasing their
capital holdings, thereby setting in motion a financial amplification mechanism. Under the
conditions of proposition 1, aggregate shocks do indeed relax or tighten the collateral con-
straint of borrowers, and thus affect their demand for the physical asset, but happen to do
so in exactly the same proportion as the wealth effect on the unconstrained agents’ demand
for the asset. In equilibrium, the asset price adjusts to induce agents to demand a constant
amount of capital, and there is no transfer of assets between the constrained and uncon-
strained sectors. The price of capital appreciates following a good shock and depreciates
following a bad shock, but the allocation of capital never deviates from its deterministic
steady state value. The fact that fire sales never occur in equilibrium explains the efficiency
of risk allocations. In a similar environment, Korinek (2011b) finds that risk allocations can
fail to be constrained efficient even when agents have access to a full set of state-contingent
assets. There, the inefficiency derives from the fact that agents undervalue wealth in states
of nature where fire sales depress asset prices. Under less restrictive assumptions than the
ones in proposition 1, fire sales will occur in our model and risk allocations will generally fail
to be efficient.
But under the assumptions of proposition 1, the competitive equilibrium prices and
allocations take particularly simple forms. Define the variable Yt ≡ [f(kt+1, lt) + F (Kt+1)],
such that aggregate output in period t is given by YtAt. Capital and labor are always
allocated as in the deterministic steady state: kt+1 = k, Kt+1 = K, lt = l for all t. Households
and entrepreneurs consume a constant fraction of aggregate output every period: Ct =
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(1− ω)Y At and ct = ωY At, where ω is related to the relative wealth positions.
12 The price
of capital is qt =
1
1−β
F ′(K)At. Assuming normality of the innovations to log TFP, the prices



























with BS = −bS and BL = −bL. The value of total bond holdings and long-term bond








The equilibrium debt maturity structure of entrepreneurs therefore consists of a fraction
β−1 > 1 of long-term debt and a fraction 1 − β−1 < 0 of short-term debt. Despite being
net borrowers, entrepreneurs have a long position in short-term bonds. The intuition for
this result has to do with the nature of the risk-sharing problem that the market is trying
to solve. The value of the asset side of leveraged entrepreneurs’ balance sheet is state-
contingent. Therefore, the market is looking for a bond portfolio whose realized one-period
ahead return is also state-contingent in order to allow entrepreneurs to shift risk to the
liability side of their balance sheet and pass it on to households. Yet long-term bonds have
12 The value of ω is given in appendix C.
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a non-state contingent component. This component corresponds to the first payment on the
bond, whose value makes up a fraction 1 − β−1 of the total value of the long-term bond.
By borrowing long-term β−1 > 1 times their net debt and placing 1 − β−1 in short-term
bonds, entrepreneurs hold a debt portfolio whose realized one-period ahead return is entirely
state-contingent. This particular debt portfolio is the only one that can achieve the socially
desirable risk-allocation.
Finally, we observe that in the presence of aggregate risk the insurance provided by long-

























This term premium is naturally an increasing function of the volatility of aggregate shocks

























It is worth mentioning that the perfect risk-sharing result established under the assump-
tions of proposition 1 continues to hold in the more general case of CRRA utility and serially
correlated TFP, but only up to a first-order of approximation. More precisely, as long as en-
forcement of long-term contracts is costless, households and entrepreneurs share risk equally
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up to a first-order, i.e. the policy functions for consumption take the following form








where x̂t = log(xt/x), O(ǫ
2) represents terms of second- or higher order, and ηxt are terms
linear in the first-order components of endogenous state variables whose values are known
as of t − 1. In these cases, the long-run (zero-order) maturity choice of agents is efficient,
and a constant tax on short- or long-term debt cannot lead to Pareto improvements.
2.4 Macroprudential policy
This section discusses the role of macroprudential policy in the model, and specifies its
objectives and instruments.
2.4.1 Motivation
In the absence of costly enforcement of long-term debt contracts, the presence of short-
and long-term bonds results in approximately effectively complete risk markets. In this case,
equilibrium debt portfolio choices result in an allocation of risk that cannot be improved upon
using a constant tax on short-term debt. However, when long-term debt is costly to enforce,
debt portfolio choices are distorted and a wedge between the private and social benefits of
the insurance provided by long-term debt leads to risk allocations that are not constrained
efficient. Individual entrepreneurs fail to internalize that by issuing more long-term debt












Fig. 2.2: Inefficient capital and risk allocations.
because the volatility of the asset price depends on the stability of entrepreneurs’ net worth,
as the collateral constraint makes the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs a direct function
of their wealth. Relying on long-term rather than short-term debt reduces the exposure
of entrepreneurs’ net worth to aggregate shocks, and therefore reduces the volatility of the
price of capital. A more stable price of capital in turn leads to a more stable distribution of
capital between the entrepreneurial and household sectors.
Figure 2.2 depicts the marginal product of capital in the two sectors. In the deter-
ministic steady-state, capital is allocated inefficiently at k (the efficient capital allocation
is at k∗) and the deadweight loss caused by the borrowing constraint corresponds to the
area of the shaded triangle.13 As the deadweight loss is a convex function of the deviation
of the capital allocation from the efficient allocation, stable capital allocations are socially
more desirable than volatile ones. The figure schematically represents two generic ergodic
distributions of capital. The distribution with higher variance corresponds to a situation
where entrepreneurs rely less on long-term debt and more on short-term debt relative to
the distribution with smaller variance. Leveraged borrowers do not generally choose a so-
13 The interpretation is identical to the one in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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cially efficient risk exposure because they fail to internalize their contribution to systemic
risk. At the margin, relying more on long-term debt and less on short-term debt reduces
the volatility of individual net worth. What borrowers fail to internalize, however, is that a
lower volatility of individual net worth reduces the volatility of asset prices and thus lowers
the volatility of other borrowers’ net worth. Entrepreneurs perceive the private insurance
benefits of long-term debt issuance, but they fail to recognize its wider social benefits arising
from the relevance of the market price of capital for financial constraints. The market failure
underlying this inefficiency result is a “fire-sale” externality similar to that emphasized by
Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009, 2009b). It is a particular application of the general
proposition of the constrained suboptimality of competitive equilibria in incomplete markets
settings by Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
2.4.2 Welfare measures and policy instruments
Let ECE [u(C)−G(L)] and ECE[u(c)] denote the unconditional expected utilities of house-
holds and entrepreneurs under the ergodic distribution induced by a competitive equilibrium
without government intervention. We consider a government that has the ability to impose
a constant tax on entrepreneurs’ issuance of short-term debt and to rebate the proceeds of
this tax to entrepreneurs.
With macroprudential policy, the entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize expected lifetime
utility subject to a sequence of collateral constraints and a sequence of budget constraints
given by








t+1 = Atf(kt+1, lt)− wtlt + qtkt + (1 + τ








where τS is tax on short-term debt, and TEt is a transfer. The household’s problem is un-
affected. A competitive equilibrium with macroprudential policy is defined by sequences of






t=0, allocations {ct, Ct, lt, Lt, bt+1, Bt+1,Φt+1, φt+1, kt+1, Kt+1}
∞
t=0,
and policy instruments (τS, {TEt }
∞
t=0) such that: (a) households maximize expected lifetime
utility subject to their sequence of budget constraints, taking as given prices, policies and
initial conditions (B0,Φ0, K0), (b) entrepreneurs maximize expected lifetime utility subject
to their sequence of budget and collateral constraints, taking as given prices, policies and
initial conditions (b0, φ0, k0), (c) the markets for short-term bonds, long-term bonds and
capital clear, and (d) the government runs a balanced budget:
TEt + τ
SbSt = 0.
Let E[u(C)−G(L)] and E[u(c)] denote the unconditional expected utilities of households
and entrepreneurs under the ergodic distribution induced by a competitive equilibrium with
macroprudential policy. We assume that the government’s objective in setting macropru-
dential policy is to maximize the unconditional expected utility of entrepreneurs subject to
providing households with an unconditional expected utility at least as high as in a compet-
itive equilibrium without government intervention, i.e. the government solves
max
τS




Standard perturbation methods for solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models are inappropriate to solve the model presented in this paper because of the presence
of portfolio choice in an incomplete market setting.14 Progress has recently been made in
this area with the methods proposed by Devereux and Sutherland (2011, Devereux and
Sutherland (2009), Tille and van Wincoop (2008) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2008) to pro-
duce approximate solutions for two-country DSGE models featuring portfolio choice under
incomplete markets. Despite a collateral constraint and differences in discount factors, the
structure of our two-agent model is remarkably similar to the two-country DSGE models
for which these methods are designed. We thus use the approach of Devereux and Suther-
land together with the “standard” algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to obtain
a second-order accurate solution of our model. The general principle underlying Devereux
and Sutherland’s approach is due to Samuelson (1970) and states that in order to derive
the solution for portfolio choice up to N -th order accuracy, the portfolio problem must be
approximated up to the N +2-th order. Appendix D provides details on the model solution.
14 The failure of standard perturbation methods in models with portfolio choice is easily understood. These
methods usually approximate the model solution around the deterministic steady state. Portfolio choices,
however, are not uniquely defined in the deterministic steady state, as assets (i.e. in our case short-term and
long-term bonds) are perfect substitutes. Hence, the deterministic steady state does not deliver a natural
approximation point. Further, a linearized solution features certainty equivalence, while portfolio choices
explicitly depend on the risk characteristics of the available assets.
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2.5.2 Functional forms and calibration
We adopt the following functional forms for utility and producton functions. Utility from










entrepreneurial production is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
f(k, l) = kαel1−αe ,
and home production is given by
F (K) = νKαh .
A and K̄ are normalized to 1. The parameters β, σ, ζ , αe are set to standard values
from the business cycle literature: β = 0.99, σ = 2, ζ = 1.01, αe = 0.36. Following Iacoviello
(2005), we set the entrepreneur’s discount factor γ to 0.98, which implies an entrepreneurial
internal rate of return twice as big as the equilibrium real interest rate. We set κ to 0.3,
which matches an entrepreneurial debt ratio (debt over assets) of 30%. Welch (2004) finds a
mean debt ratio of 29.8% in a sample of over 60,000 large publicly traded firms in the period
1964-2000. The capital share in home produciton is set to αh = 0.13, as in Greenwood and
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Source/target
Steady-state productivity A = 1 Normalization
Fixed capital stock K̄ = 1 Normalization
Household’s discount factor β = 0.99 Standard DSGE value
Entrepreneur’s discount factor γ = 0.98 Internal rate of return 2x real rate
Coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 2 Standard DSGE value
Elasticity parameter of labor supply ζ = 1.01 Virtually flat labor supply
Share of collateralizable assets κ = 0.3 Debt ratio = 30%, Welch (2004)
Capital share in entrepreneur’s output αe = 0.36 Standard DSGE value
Capital share in home production αh = 0.13 Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991)
Shift parameter in home production ν = 0.41 Corporate share of productive capital = 75%
Monitoring cost on LT contracts ϑ = 0.030 Long-run debt duration = 3.9 years
TFP process ρ = 0.57 Autocorrelation ρY = 0.84 and
σA = 0.012 standard deviation σY = 0.017 of U.S. GDP
Tab. 2.1: Parameter values
Hercowitz (1991). The scale factor ν in home production is set to yield a steady state ratio of
productive assets held by the corporate sector k/(K + k) of 75%, in line with Flow of Funds
data. The monitoring cost parameter θ is set 0.030, implying a long-run average maturity
structure (duration) of 3.9 years (corresponding to a maturity structure with weights of 0.85
on short-term debt and 0.15 on long-term debt).15 This seems consistent with the descriptive
results in Barclay and Smith (1995), who study a large sample of non-financial corporations
from 1974 to 1992.16 Finally, we use simulations to set the parameters governing the TFP
process, ρ and σA, at values that make the model match the cyclical time series properties
of quartely U.S. real GDP for the period 1947-2007. In the data, we find an autocorrelation
of GDP of 0.84 and standard deviation of 0.017, and setting the parameters to ρ = 0.57 and
σA = 0.012 replicates these moments. Table 2.1 summarizes the calibration.
15 The duration of the short-term bond is one quarter, while the duration of long-term bond is 1/(1−β) =
100 quarters.
16 Standard data sources like COMPUSTAT only report the the percentage of debt that matures in more
than one, two, three, four and five years. Uncovering a debt duration from this data is difficult, but a value
of 3.9 years seems broadly consistent with the data. Given the uncertainty surrounding this parameter value,
it will be worth making robustness checks with respect to it.
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2.5.3 Results
Positive implications of debt maturity
Figure 2.3 illustrates the impulse responses of some of the model’s variables to a 1% neg-
ative innovation to log TFP in the benchmark model with only short-term debt, as well as
in the multiple maturities model under two different assumptions regarding the enforcement
cost of long-term contracts (in the absence of macro-prudential policy). The responses in the
benchmark case with only short-term debt are represented with dashed lines, while those in
the model with multiple maturities are represented with solid lines. The light (red) line is the
multiple maturities model with costless enforcement of long-term debt (ϑ = 0) and the dark
(black) line is the multiplied maturities model with costly enforcement with the monitoring
cost calibrated to yield an equilibrium maturity structure with an average duration of 3.9
years. Several comments are in order. First, we observe that when enforcement of long-
term contracts is costless, risk markets are approximately effectively complete and shocks
do not cause first-order changes in the wealth distribution. Entrepreneurs and households
share risk equally.17 In this case, capital does not get reallocated much following the shock.
Consequently, the path of aggregate output follows mainly the mean-reverting path of TFP.
In contrast, when long-term contracts are costly to enforce, borrowers choose more short-
term debt in their portfolios, and entrepreneurs suffer relatively more than households from
a negative aggregate shock. This disproportionately large deterioration in their net worth
tightens their collateral constraint and induces a reallocation of capital towards the uncon-
strained household sector: fire sales occur. The standard financial amplification mechanism
17 This can be observed from the fact that their consumption responses are identical. Again, this holds


















































multiple maturities, no friction on long−term debt:
long−run maturity 101% long−term debt
benchmark with only short−term debt
multiple maturities, friction on long−term debt set to obtain
long−run maturity of 3.9 years (15% of long−term debt)
Fig. 2.3: Impulse responses to 1% negative TFP shock in benchmark model with only short-term
debt, and with multiple maturities (with and without monitoring cost on long-term debt).
is at work here. The negative shock reduces the entrepreneurs’ wealth, thereby reducing
their ability to borrow. Facing tightening financial conditions, entrepreneurs fire-sell assets,
causing further declines in the asset price (as households value the physical capital at a
decreasing rate). This decline in the asset price reduces the entrepreneurs’ wealth further,
leading to yet another round of fire sales. After the shock and the fire sales, entrepreneurs
slowly rebuild their capital holdings because it takes time for them to re-accumulate net
worth and re-establish borrowing capacity at its pre-shock level. When long-term debt is
costly to enforce, the high risk exposure of leveraged borrowers is a source of amplification
and persistence of fundamental shocks, as in the benchmark case with only short-term debt.
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Normative results
In order to analyze the normative implications of macroprudential policy, we compute
welfare by calculating the unconditional expected utility of the households and entrepreneurs
using a second-order accurate solution for consumption, and a second-order Taylor expansion
of the period utility function. Hence, our welfare measures correctly reflect changes in both
the unconditional mean and the unconditional variance of consumption and labor supply
brought about by taxes on short-term debt.
In the competitive equilibrium without macroprudential policy, monitoring costs are such
that the long-run debt maturity structure consists of 85% of short-term debt and 15% of
long-term debt, resulting in an average duration of the debt portfolio of 3.9 years. A 100%
short-term maturity structure would yield a duration of 1 quarter, while a 100% long-term
maturity structure would correspond to a duration of 25 years (i.e. 1/(1 − β) = 100 quar-
ters). By taxing entrepreneurs’ issuance of short-term debt, a macroprudential authority
can effectively lengthen the equilibrium long-run debt maturity structure. Figure 2.4 shows
households’ (upper panels) and entrepreneurs’ (lower panels) welfare in equivalent consump-
tion terms at different long-run equilibrium maturity structures induced by various levels of
taxes on short-term debt. The figure illustrates that by using taxes to lenghten the maturity
structure, the macroprudential authority does more than just shifting risk from entrepreneurs
to households. Maturity structures longer than in the competitive equilibrium can reduce
risk and increase welfare for both groups of agents. This result is explained by the positive
spillovers that arise when an individual entrepreneur lenghtens his debt maturity. Such a
lengthening leads to a more stable net worth, and therefore to fewer fire sales and more stable
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capital holdings at the individual level. This in turn leads to less volatile asset prices, which
helps out other entrepreneurs, as well as to more stable wages, which benefits households.
Those positive spill-over effects are not perceived by atomistic entrepreneurs in a decentral-
ized equilibrium. In the language of financial markets, each individual entrepreneur fails to
internalize the reduction in systemic risk that a lengthening of his own maturity structure
would bring about.
On the other hand, figure 2.4 illustrates that the socially desirable maturity structure
does not simply coincide with the maturity structure that would arise in the absence of
costly enforcement of long-term contracts - a structure consisting of 101% of long-term debt.
When long-term debt enforcement is costly, a longer maturity structure is beneficial for
risk-sharing purposes, but it entails more resources spent on monitoring expenses. When
the macroprudential authority uses taxes to induce agents to substitute long-term debt for
short-term debt, it also causes more resources to be wasted in unproductive monitoring costs.
The model hence captures what is widely seen as the trade-off faced by policy makers when
trying to distort maturity choices away from their competitive equilibrium levels.
The optimal maturity structure in the model consists of 50% of short-term debt and 50%
of long-term debt, or a debt duration of 12.5 years. This contrasts remarkably with the debt
maturity structure of the competitive equilibrium without government intervention. The
optimal constant tax is given by τS = 0.00013, which represents an annual tax of 0.052% of
the face value of short-term bonds. The optimal tax corresponds to about half of the term
premium implied by the model. The fact that this tax is quantitatively small relates to the
equity premium puzzle or its bond counterpart, the term premium puzzle: with CRRA utility,
a realistic calibration of the aggregate shock process results in welfare costs of uncertainty
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% of debt that is long−term (increasing in τS)
Competitive Equilibrium (τS=0)
Pareto−frontier






















% of debt that is long−term (increasing in τS)
Fig. 2.4: Welfare and debt maturity structure: tax on short-term debt.
that are so low that model-based risk premia are unrealistically small. Accordingly, a tiny
tax on short-term debt suffices to move the equilibrium maturity structure by considerable
amounts.
To illustrate the implications of macroprudential policy for allocations and prices, figure
2.5 plots ergodic densities for some of the variables based on simulations for 100,000 periods
of the model without government intervention and with the tax on short-term debt set at
its optimal level. The numbers to the right of the densities in each panel are the variables’
standard deviations din the cases without government intervention and with the optimal
tax on short-term debt, respectively. The figure reveals that the tax on short-term debt
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Fig. 2.5: Ergodic densities of the model’s variables in the competitive equilibrium without macro-
prudential policy (thin line) and in the competitive equilibrium with macroprudential
policy (socially optimal tax on short-term debt, thick line).
significantly reduces the volatility of entrepreneurial consumption, asset prices, credit, em-
ployment and the capital allocation across the two sectors, while it only marginally reduces
consumption risk for households.
The consequences of a tax on short-term debt are further illustrated in figure 2.6, where
the ergodic densities of output with and without the tax on short-term debt are displayed.
The standard deviation of output is reduced by the tax from 1.73% to 1.31%, a 25% decrease.
Moreover, when a crisis is defined as an output level more than one standard deviation below
mean output in the laissez-faire case, we find that the tax on short-term debt reduces the
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long-run probability of a crisis by a factor of eight, lowering it from 2.33% to 0.28%. The
model hence predicts that taxing short-term debt can bring about a quantitatively significant
reduction in the incidence of crises.
As mentioned in section 2.4.1, less volatile factor allocations also contribute to reduce
the deadweight loss caused by the collateral constraint. This effect can be seen from the
0.14% increase in long-run mean gross output brought about by the optimal tax on short-
term debt. Interestingly, even when the additional monitoring costs caused by a lengthening
of the maturity structure are subtracted from aggregate income, the long-run mean net
output (available for consumption since there is no investment) is still 0.09% higher under
the optimal tax on short-term debt than in the laissez-faire case. In the framework of the
model, the reduction in macroeconomic volatility achieved by taxing short-term debt and
inducing agents to rely on longer term financing does not come at the expense of lower mean
output, even after netting out the increased resource loss associated with more monitoring
activities.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium model of the determinants of pri-
vate agents’ debt maturity. By featuring a number of practically relevant financial frictions,
the model captures the largely agreed on trade-off between the insurance benefits of long-
term debt and the borrowing cost benefits of short-term debt. The analysis indicates that
when asset prices affect financing constraints in the economy, debt maturity choices made
in decentralized markets are generally not constrained efficient. In particular, the results
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Fig. 2.6: Ergodic density of aggregate output in the competitive equilibrium without macropru-
dential policy (thin line) and in the competitive equilibrium with macroprudential policy
(socially optimal tax on short-term debt, thick line).
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suggest that individual borrowers issue too much short-term debt and too little long-term
debt in a competitive equilibrium, as they fail to internalize the reduction in systemic risk
brought about by a lengthening of their debt maturity structure. The paper also shows that
a constant tax on short-term debt can lead to Pareto improvements and result in substan-
tially less volatile allocations and asset prices. The analysis hence provides a theoretical
foundation for a macroprudential policy framework that would penalize short-term debt.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS (CHAPTER 1)
Proof of lemma 1
Without loss of generality, consider state (i, s). For part 1., differentiating (1.9) for j = A
and (1.11) with respect to ℓA yields













(1− κ)rkB +∆(ℓA + ℓB)
)
. (A.2)
Now, observe that ℓA + ℓB < kA and r < 1 < R
is imply that the following inequality holds
∆(ℓA + ℓB) + r(ℓA − ℓB) < ∆kA + 2R
isℓA.
Adding and subtracting r on the left-hand side, one obtains
∆(ℓA + ℓB) + rkB − rkA < ∆kA + 2R
isℓA.
Since ∆ ≡ A− r, this implies
∆ℓB + (∆−R
is)ℓA + rkB < AkA +R
isℓA. (A.3)
Together with Ris = κrkB/ℓA < ∆ and the concavity of u(·), this implies that for given
(kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) in region II, the expression in (A.2) is larger than the one in (A.1).
For part 2., differentiating (1.10) for j = B and (1.12) with respect to kB yields
∂V isi (kB, ℓB, R
is)
∂kB
























(A.3), Ris = κrkB/ℓA < ∆ and the concavity of u(·) imply that for given (kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) in
region II, the expression in (A.5) is smaller than the one in (A.4).
Proof of lemma 2
For part 1., differentiating (1.16) with respect to ℓA yields
∂V̂ idi (kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB)
∂ℓA
= 0. (A.6)
Clearly, for any (kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) in region II, the expression in (A.6) is smaller than the one
in (A.2).
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For part 2., differentiating (1.17) with respect to kB yields




(1− κ)rkB +∆(ℓA + ℓB)
)
. (A.7)
For any (kA, kB, ℓA, ℓB) in region II, the expression in (A.7) is smaller than the one in (A.5).
Proof of lemma 3
For part 1., we simply observe that the expression in (A.6) is smaller than the one in
(A.1). Similarly, for part 2., it is clear that the expression in (A.7) is smaller than the one
in (A.4).
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Proof of proposition 1
We start by defining the two functions characterizing a symmetric competitive equilib-










































































Under assumption 3, the value of k in a symmetric competitive equilibrium, kCE , falls in







, and is implicitly given by gII(k
CE) = 0. A
necessary condition for a globally regulated equilibrium is that g̃II(k̃) = 0 if
1
1+κr
< k̃ < ∆
∆+κr
,
g̃II(k̃) ≤ 0 if k̃ =
1
1+κr
and g̃II(k̃) ≥ 0 if k̃ =
∆
∆+κr
. Note that if g′II(k) < 0, g̃
′
II(k) < 0













with g̃II(k̃) = 0, or
k̃ = 1
1+κr
< kCE with g̃II(k̃) < 0. It follows that showing that g
′
II(k) < 0, g̃
′
II(k) < 0 and







is sufficient to prove that k̃ < kCE.
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. It follows that k̃ < kCE, and therefore that ℓ̃ > ℓCE .
Proof of proposition 2



























Under assumption 3, the value of k in a symmetric competitive equilibrium, kCE, falls in the







, and is implicitly given by gII(k
CE) = 0 (with gII(·)
defined in A.8). A necessary condition for a globally regulated equilibrium is that g̃II(k̃) = 0
(with g̃II(·) defined in A.9) if
1
1+κr
< k̃ < ∆
∆+κr
, g̃II(k̃) ≤ 0 if k̃ =
1
1+κr
and g̃II(k̃) ≥ 0 if
k̃ = ∆
∆+κr
. Similarly, a necessary condition for a nationally regulated equilibrium is that
ĝII(k̂) = 0 if
1
1+rκ
< k̂ < ∆
∆+κr
, ĝII(k̂) ≤ 0 if k̂ =
1
1+κr




if ĝ′II(k) < 0, g̃
′







, then we can be a priori in
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either of the following three situations
• k̂ = k̃ = 1
1+κr
, with ĝII(k̂) ≤ 0, g̃II(k̃) < 0,
• k̃ = 1
1+κr
< k̂, with ĝII(k̂) ≥ 0, g̃II(k̃) ≤ 0,
• 1
1+κr
< k̃ < kCE and k̃ < k̂ with ĝII(k̂) ≥ 0, g̃II(k̃) = 0.
It follows that showing that ĝ′II(k) < 0, g̃
′








sufficient to prove that k̂ ≥ k̃. Moreover, if in addition k̂ > 1
1+κr
, then k̂ > k̃.







has been established as part of proposition 1.




(A− 1)k + 1
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+πsi[(1− κ)r −∆][(1 − κ)r − 2∆]u′′
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rk +∆(1 − k)
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• k̂ ≥ k̃ and ℓ̂ ≤ ℓ̃,
• if k̂ > 1
1+κr
then k̂ > k̃ and ℓ̂ < ℓ̃.
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Proof of proposition 3








CE) = 0 (with gII(·) defined in (A.8)).
A necessary condition for a nationally regulated equilibrium is that ĝII(k̂) = 0 (with ĝII(·)
defined in (A.10)) if 1
1+κr
< k̂ < ∆
∆+κr
, ĝII(k̂) ≤ 0 if k̂ =
1
1+κr




Note that if g′II(k) < 0, ĝ
′













with ĝII(k̂) = 0, or k̂ =
∆
∆+κr
> kCE with ĝII(k̂) ≥ 0. The fact that
g′II(k) < 0 and ĝ
′







has already been established in the proofs








sufficient to prove that k̂ > kCE .




















(1− κ)rk2 + 2∆(1− k)k
(A.11)















if and only if the transformed
function
Φ̂T (k) ≡ [(A+ κr)(1− k)][(1− κ)rk
2 + 2∆(1− k)k]Φ̂(k)







. Conveniently, Φ̂T (k) is quadratic:
Φ̂T (k) = (1− κ)κr
2k2 + 2∆κr(1− k)k −∆(A + κr)(1− k)2,
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with a derivative given by
Φ̂′T (k) = 2(1− κ)κr
2k + 2∆κr(1− k)− 2∆κrk + 2∆(A+ κr)(1− k).




, both Φ̂T (k) and Φ̂
′
T (k) are strictly positive








































(1− κ)r + 2κr + (A−∆)
]
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. This, together with the strict
positiveness of Φ̂T (
1
1+rκ
) and Φ̂T (
∆
∆+rκ















. It follows that
k̂ > kCE , and therefore ℓ̂ < ℓCE.
Proof of proposition 4
For regulations in country B sufficiently close to a competitive equilibrium (i.e. KB in
the neighborhood of kCE), the date 0 investment decision of private agents in country A
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When evaluated at (k,KB) = (k


















Hence kCEA is decreasing in KB.
Proof of proposition 5
In the neighborhood of the symmetric competitive equilibrium, country A’s national




πωV̂ ω(kA, kB, 1− kA, 1− kB) (A.13)
= πiiu
(





















+ πsi(−∆)[(1− κ)r −∆]u′′
(
(1− κ)rkA +∆(1− kA + 1− kB)
)
This cross derivative is unambiguously negative. It follows that the regulators’ actions are
strategic substitutes.
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Proof of proposition 6
Note that ∂W
∂LB















[(1− κ)r − 2∆]kCE + 2∆
)]
= −πisΦ̂(kCE)
where Φ̂(k) ≡ ĝII(k)− gII(k), for gII(·) and ĝII(·) defined in (A.8) and (A.10), respectively.
The proof of proposition 3 established that under the logarithmic utility assumption, Φ̂(k)














, it follows that Φ̂(kCE) > 0,
and therefore that ∂W
∂LB
< 0. Proposition 4 established that
dℓCEA
dLB
< 0, and it was argued in
the text that ∂W
∂ℓA
> 0. Hence the direct effect and the indirect effect of a change in country
















Proof of proposition 7







, it follows that ∂Π
∂ℓA





it was argued in the text that ∂W
∂ℓA




, it follows that ∂Π
∂LB
> 0. Hence
the direct effect and the indirect effect of a change in country B’s regulation on country A’s
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B. DETERMINISTIC STEADY-STATE (CHAPTER 2)
This appendix gives details on the model’s deterministic steady state.
Combining entrepreneur’s optimal labor demand condition with household’s optimal la-





From the households’ first-order conditions, the steady-state asset prices are given by
qS = β, qL = β/(1 − β) and q = AF ′(K)/(1 − β). From the entrepreneurs’ first-order
conditions, the steady-state multiplier is given by µ = (1 − γ/β)u′(c) and the asset prices
must satisfy
q = Afk(k, l)/[1− γ − κ(1− γ/β)].
Combining the two expressions for the asset price q, we obtain
AF ′(K) =
β(1− β)
β(1− β) + (β − κ)(β − γ)
Afk(k, l)

















From the household’s budget constraint, steady state household consumption C is given
by
C = AF (K) + Afl(k, l)l + β
−1κAF ′(K)k.









u′ (AF (K) + Afl(k, l)l + β−1κAF ′(K)k)
.
For further references, it is useful to define the household’s beginning of period wealth
as Zt ≡ qtKt + B
S




t and the entrepreneur’s beginning of period wealth as
zt ≡ qtkt + b
S




t . Also, define aggregate wealth as Ωt ≡ Zt + zt. The steady state
wealth positions are given by
Z = qK + β−1κqk
z = qk − β−1κqk.
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It is also useful to define the entrepreneur’s share of consumption in aggregate output as
ω̃ ≡ ct/[YtAt] and the according household’s share of consumption in aggregate output as
(1− ω̃) ≡ Ct/[YtAt]. In the steady state, these shares are given by
ω̃ =
f(k, l)− fl(k, l)l − β
−1κF ′(K)k
F (K) + f(k, l)
and
1− ω̃ =
F (K) + fl(k, l)l + β
−1κF ′(K)k
F (K) + f(k, l)
.
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C. PROOFS (CHAPTER 2)
Proof of Proposition 1
We show here that under the assumptions of log utility and serially uncorrelated TFP, the
costless enforcement model results in effectively complete risk markets, perfect risk sharing
between entrepreneurs and households, and no persistence in allocations and asset prices.
We also show that the entrepreneur’s collateral constraint binds in every period and state.
We proceed by first postulating allocations and prices, and then showing that given these
prices, the allocations satisfy both agents’ optimality conditions and constraints.
Assume u(·) = ln(·), ρ = 0 and ϑ = 0. Consider initial values for capital and bond
allocations that result in a distribution of wealth corresponding to the one prevailing in the
deterministic steady state (see Appendix B), i.e. Z0 = (1 − ω)Ω0 and z0 = ωΩ0, where
Ω0 ≡ Z0 + z0.
Define Yt ≡ F (Kt) + f(kt, lt), denote by k and K the allocation of capital in the deter-
ministic steady state and by l employment in the deterministic steady-state. We conjecture
the following allocations: kt = k, Kt = K, lt = 1, ct = ω̃Y At and Ct = (1 − ω̃)Y At (see
Appendix B for the value of ω̃). It is straightforward to verify that with those allocations,
both agents’ optimality conditions for labor supply/demand, Euler equations for capital,












and the wage is given by
wt = Atfl(k, l),
provided that the entrepreneurs’ collateral constraint binds as the multiplier on the constraint
satisfies
µt = (1− γ/β)/(ωYAt).










and BS = −bS , BL = −bL.
It is straightforward to verify that the two agents budget constraints and the entrepreneurs’
borrowing constraint hold with equality in every period and state. By showing that both
agents’ optimality conditions, budget constraints and borrowing constraints all hold with
equality at the candidate allocations and prices, we have established that these constitute a
competitive equilibrium.
The allocations are identical to the ones obtained in an environment with a full set of
Arrow securities, where the household’s and entrepreneur’s budget constraints would be
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given by





t) = A(st)F (K(st)) + w(st)L(st) + q(st)K(st−1) +B(st)





t) = A(st)f(k(st), l(st))− w(st)l(st) + q(st)k(st−1) + b(st),







In these expressions, st has the usual interpretation of the state at time t, while s
t describes
the entire history up to time t. B(st+1, s
t) and b(st+1, s
t) denote the holdings of recursive
Arrow securities available for trade at time t, and q(st+1, s
t) denotes the price of these
securities.
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D. MODEL SOLUTION UNDER INCOMPLETE MARKETS
(CHAPTER 2)
This appendix gives some details on the solution of the model when markets are in-
complete. The solution approach follows the one by Devereux and Sutherland (2009, 2011)
and is adapted to be used together with the regular algorithm of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004) that computes first- and second-order approximations to the policy function in DSGE
models without portfolio choices.
For future reference, we distinguish between portfolio variables and non-portfolio vari-
ables. The welfare calculations of Section 2.5 require a second-order accurate solution for
households’ consumption Ct and entrepreneurs’ consumption ct, which are both non-portfolio
variables. As the model presented in this paper belongs to a general class of models in which
second-order accurate solutions for non-portfolio variables only require a first-order accurate
solution for portfolio variables, we only need to solve for the debt portfolio up to a first-order.
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2009, 2011), we do this in steps. We first solve for the
zero-order of the debt portfolio, and then use this zero-order portfolio to obtain a first-order
accurate solution for non-portfolio variables. We then use this first-order solution to solve
for the first-order portfolio. Finally, we use the first-order portfolio to obtain a second-order
accurate solution for non-portfolio variables.
D.1 Zero-order portfolio and first-order non-portfolio variables
Solving for φ
Rewrite the model equilibrium conditions as
ceĉt + qeq̂tkek̂t+1 + (b̂t+1 + b) = αeAe
Âtkαeeαek̂t+1l1−αee(1−αe)l̂t + qeq̂tkek̂t
+rSer̂St(b̂t + b) + τ
SrSer̂
S
t (b̂t + b− φ̂t − φ)
+β−1(er̂Lt − er̂St)(φ̂t + φ)








(b̂t+1 + b) + (B̂t+1 +B) = 0
kek̂t+1 +KeK̂t+1 = K̄








































































αeeαek̂t+1l−αee−αe l̂t = lζ−1e(ζ−1)l̂tCσeσĈt
111
where x̂t ≡ ln(xt/x) for all variables except φt and bt, for which φ̂t ≡ φt − φ and b̂t ≡ bt − b.
Taking first-order Taylor expansions of the above equations results in a linear system where
φ̂t does not appear and φ appears only in the first equation
cĉt + qkk̂t+1 + b̂t+1 = Terms in Ât, k̂t, l̂t + r
Sbr̂St + r
S b̂t + β
−1φ(r̂Lt − r̂St) +O(ǫ
2),
where O(ǫ2) denotes terms second and higher orders. The first-order system cannot be
simply solved as in a model without portfolio choice, because the zero-order portfolio φ is
unknown. However, the first-order system can be solved conditional on some φ. From the
first-order approximation of the households’ two Euler equation for short- and long-term
bonds, we notice that EtrLt+1 = rSt+1 + O(ǫ
2). Hence, the excess return on the portfolio
β−1φ(r̂Lt − r̂St) is a zero mean i.i.d. random variable up to a first-order of approximation.
Devereux and Sutherland’s approach consists in replacing this term by an exogenous zero
mean i.i.d. random variable, solving the first-order approximation of the model, later on
recognizing that this term is the excess return and using the first-order solution of the
modified model together with a second-order approximation of the agents’ Euler equations
to solve for the zero-order portfolio. To operationalize this approach using the standard
algorithm of Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (SGU), we alternatively replace the excess return
term in the exact entrepreneur’s budget constraint by an exogenous variables ξ̂t, so that
ξ̂t ≡ β
−1(er̂Lt − er̂St)(φ̂t + φ).
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A first-order approximation of the entrepreneur’s budget constraint then gives
cĉt + qkk̂t+1 + b̂t+1 = Terms in Ât, k̂t, l̂t + r
Sbr̂St + r
S b̂t + ξ̂t +O(ǫ
2),
while a first-order approximation of the definition of ξ̂t yields
ξ̂t = β
−1φ(r̂Lt − r̂St) +O(ǫ
2).
We thus replace the excess return term by ξ̂t in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint and
append Etξ̂t+1 = 0 to the set of equilibrium conditions of the model. Denote by ǫ̃t the vector









first-order accurate solution of the modified model using the SGU algorithm is given by
yt = gxxt +O(ǫ
2),
xt+1 = hxxt + ησǫt+1 +O(ǫ
2),
where xt is a vector of (exogenous and endogenous) state variables, yt is a vector of control
variables and gx, hx are coefficient matrices. The solution for the control variables can thus
also be written as
yt = gxhxxt−1 + gxησǫt +O(ǫ
2)
Defining Θ1 ≡ gxhx and Θ2 ≡ gxησ, the solution for the control variables can be expressed
as
yt = Θ1xt−1 +Θ2ǫt +O(ǫ
2)
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By extracting the appropriate rows of this solution, we can write






















c+1. Hence, we can write
the two expressions for (σĈ ′ − σĉ′) and (r̂′L − r̂
′
S) as

















Now we use the fact that ǫ′0 = ξ̂
′ = φβ−1(r̂′L − r̂
′
S) +O(ǫ
2) in (D.1) and (D.2) to get




































= −(1 − β)σ2ϑ + τ
S +O(ǫ3)
Substituting the first-oder accurate expressions for (σĈ ′−σĉ′) and (r̂′L−r̂
′
S) into this portfolio
equation leads to the following quadratic equation for the zero-order portfolio
mφ2 + nφ+ p = 0 +O(ǫ3),
where





























cd + (1− β)σ2ϑ − τ
S








2 = 0 (the excess return does not depend on the portfolio up to a first-
order), the monitoring cost potentially introduces multiple equilibrium zero-order portfolios.
In our case, only one of the two solutions of the quadratic equation is a valid equilibrium,
but it is worth noting that this is not always the case. In the costless enforcement case where
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(1− β)σ2ϑ = 0 and short-term debt is not taxed (τ
S = 0) the zero-order portfolio is given by


















which is analogous to the expression in Devereux and Sutherland (2011).
First-order solution for non-portfolio variables, once φ is known
Once φ has been computed, we can go back to the original model, replace φt by φ in the
entrepreneur’s budget constraint. Note that this is not a correct equilibrium condition, but
just an artifice to solve the model using the SGU algorithm. Since linearizing this artificial
equation gives the same expression as a linearization of the true budget constraint, as far
as the first-order accuracy is concerned, we can solve the model using this modified budget
constraint.
D.2 First-order portfolio and second-order non-portfolio variables
We are now interested in obtaining a first-order accurate solution for φt and a second-
order accurate solution for non-portfolio variables.
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First-order solution for φ




cĉ2t + qkk̂t+1 +
1
2




qkk̂2t + qkq̂tk̂t + τ




+rS b̂t + r








−1φ̂t(r̂Lt − r̂St) +O(ǫ
3)
We now postulate that φ̂t is linear in the model’s state variables:
φ̂t = [ψ]k[xt−1]
k +O(ǫ2)
Following Devereux and Sutherland, we again replace the excess return term in the original
entrepreneur’s budget constraint by
ξ̂t ≡ β
−1(er̂Lt − er̂St)(φ̂t + φ).




cĉ2t + qkk̂t+1 +
1
2




qkk̂2t + qkq̂tk̂t + τ




+rS b̂t + r
S r̂Stb̂t + ξ̂t +O(ǫ
3)
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while a second-order approximation of the definition of ξ̂t yields
ξ̂t = φβ




−1φ̂t(r̂Lt − r̂St) +O(ǫ
3).
Now, given that φ̂t is a function of xt−1, the term β
−1φ̂t(r̂Lt − r̂St) satisfies
Et[β
−1φ̂t+1(r̂Lt+1 − r̂St+1)] = 0 +O(ǫ
3),
i.e. the realized excess return on the time-varying element of the portfolio is a zero-mean
i.i.d. random variable up to a second-order of accuracy. As we did for the first-order accurate
model solution, we therefore initially treat this term as an exogenous zero mean i.i.d. random
variable ǫ0t. We thus use the budget constraint with ξ̂t in place of the excess return term
and append to the other model equilibrium conditions the following equation:
Etξ̂t+1 = φβ


































Forwarding the solution for control variables one period ahead, substituting the solution for
contemporaneous state variables and distinguishing terms of first- and second-order for the
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where the arrays [D0], [D1], [D2], [D3], [D4], [D5] are some functions of the arrays [hx], [hxx],
[hσσ], [gx], [gxx] and [gσσ]. We can thus write the second-order accurate conditional solution
for the difference in marginal utility (σĈ ′ − σĉ′) and the excess return (r̂′L − r̂
′
S) as
























































a,c+1. Note that second-order terms that contain ǫ
′
0 disappear
from the second-order accurate expressions (i.e. are part of the O(ǫ3) term) since ǫ0 is
actually itself a second-order term. Hence, we can write the two expressions for (σĈ ′ − σĉ′)
and (r̂′L − r̂
′
S) as







































f ]a[ǫ̃′]c +O(ǫ3) (D.2)
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Since up to a first-order, the expected excess return is zero, we know that [D1]
2
a[x
f ]a = 0.







f ]a[xf ]b are constants. Taking expectations on both sides of (D.2)
implies that
[D0]












so that (r̂′L − r̂
′

























































































The first-order accurate solutions for Ĉ ′, ĉ′, r̂′L, r̂
′
S and q̂L are also useful:
Ĉ ′ = [D1]
3
a[x





























































= −(1− β)σ2ϑ + τ
S + (1− β)σ2ϑq̂L + (1− β)σ
2
ϑσEĈ
′ + τS r̂′S − τ
SEĉ′ +O(ǫ4)
We assume that all third moments of the vector of exogenous shocks ǫ̃′ are zero. Substituting
the expressions derived above for (σĈ ′−σĉ′), (r̂L− r̂S), Ĉ
′, ĉ′, r̂′L, r̂
′
S and q̂L into the terms of
the third-order portfolio equation leads, after a number of manipulations and simplifications,





























For σϑ = τ
S = 0, this expressions collapses to the one in Devereux and Sutherland (2009).
Second-order solution for non-portfolio variables, once first-order φt is known
Once the ψa’s have been computed, we can go back to the original model and replace φt
by












in the entrepreneur’s budget constraint, and replace φt by φ in the economy’s resource
constraint. Note that again, these are not a correct equilibrium condition, but just an artifice
to solve the model using the SGU algorithm. Since taking a second-order approximation of
the modified entrepreneur’s budget constraint gives the same expression as a second-order
approximation of the true budget constraint and taking a second-order approximation of the
modified resource constraint gives the same expression as the second-order approximation of
the true resource constraint, as far as second-order accuracy is concerned, we can solve the
model using these modified constraints.
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